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Abstract 
 
International tax avoidance by multinational corporations is now front-page news. In a 
time of public austerity, citizens and legislators around the world have focused on the 
erosion of the corporate income tax base.  In response, in 2012 the G-20—the gathering 
of the leaders of the world’s twenty largest economies—launched the “Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting” (BEPS) project, the most extensive attempt to change international tax 
norms since the 1920s. 
This article is the first to explain that in the course of the BEPS project, the field of 
international tax has adopted the institutional and procedural architecture for 
multilateral action used in international financial law.  But will that architecture work in 
the international tax context?  To answer that question, the article applies lessons from 
the international financial law literature to assess international tax agreements that are 
now being reached through soft law instruments and procedures comparable to those 
that characterize international financial law.  This initial analysis is largely pessimistic.  
However, the article then describes how model tax treaty law—although also a form of 
soft law—is highly effective, and differentiates the political economy of international tax 
law from that of international financial law.  As a result, a key theoretical point emerges:  
bifurcating analysis of multilateral efforts to change international tax norms into their 
Model Treaty–based and non-Model Treaty–based components is necessary in order to 
understand the new regime for international tax governance. At a more practical level, 
bifurcating the analysis highlights that observers should expect the Model Treaty–based 
parts of the BEPS project to be implemented, as well as most parts of the project focused 
on tax transparency.  By contrast, sustained international coordination in implementing 
other dimensions of the project is doubtful.  In reaching these conclusions, the Article 
contributes to the broader international economic governance literature by using a high-
profile example from international tax diplomacy to show how underlying legal 
institutions affect the prospects for implementation of international regulatory 
agreements.  
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Breaking BEPS:  The New International Tax Diplomacy 
 
Itai Grinberg1 
Introduction 
In recent years, international tax avoidance by multinational corporations has been front-
page news. Senior executives from companies like Amazon, Apple, Google, and 
Microsoft were hauled before parliamentary committees around the world to face heated 
inquiries into their international tax strategies.2  Demonstrators picketed Starbucks to 
protest aggressive international tax planning.3   Australian diplomats started calling 
international tax a “barbeque stopper,” meaning that Australians stop eating their beloved 
barbeque to discuss international tax avoidance.4 Across Europe, Asia, and the United 
States, press exposés and high-profile legislative hearings concentrated public attention 
on aggressive international tax planning.  In a time of public austerity—a result of the 
greatest financial crisis in a generation—citizens around the world have been more 
focused on the erosion of the corporate income tax base than ever before.  In response to 
that concern, Presidents and Prime Ministers are now insisting on change in the 
international tax regime.  
With all the pressure for change, the thorny question is: will meaningful coordination to 
address international tax avoidance by multinational corporations be agreed to and 
implemented by tax authorities, and why or why not?  A moment’s reflection suggests 
that the challenges of transnational economic regulation are not unique to international 
taxation.  This Article argues that we can draw lessons from international finance, 
because the field of international tax is currently moving in the direction of an 
institutional and procedural architecture for multilateral action that resembles 
international financial law.  
The growing institutional and procedural similarity between international tax and 
international financial law is a key consequence of the “Base Erosion and Profit Shifting”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  I thank Lily Batchelder, Steve Cohen, 
Jesse Eggert, Lily Faulhaber, Anna Gelpern, Greg Klass, Pasquale Pistone, Michael Plowgian, Larry 
Solum, David Super, Josh Teitelbaum, Carlos Vazquez, and participants at the Hebrew University-
Columbia Law School Tax Conference and Georgetown Law Faculty Workshop for comments on earlier 
drafts.  Ben Brookstone, Brooke Johnson and Elena Madaj provided excellent research assistance.  All 
errors are my own.  
2 See e.g., Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code, Part II (Apple, Inc.): Hearing before the 
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, 113th Cong. 35-53 (2013) (testimony of Timothy D. Cook, Apple, 
Inc., and Peter Oppenheimer, Apple, Inc.); Public Accounts Committee, United Kingdom, Minutes of Oral 
Evidence, HC 716 (2012) (examination of Troy Alstead, Starbucks; Andrew Cecil, Amazon; Matt Brittin, 
Google); Economic References Committee, Official Committee Hansard, Australian Senate: Hearing on 
Corporate Tax Avoidance 42-60 (2015) (testimony of Maile Carnegie, Google Australia; Tony King, Apply 
Pty Ltd; &  Bill Sample, Microsoft). 
3 UK Uncut Protests over Starbucks ‘tax avoidance,’ BBC (Dec. 8, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-
20650945.  
4 Lee A. Sheppard, Barbecue Stoppers and Permanent Establishment, 2015 WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY 113-4 
(June 12, 2015).   
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(BEPS) project—a global effort to address international tax avoidance launched by the G-
20, the annual gathering of the leaders of the world’s twenty largest economies.  The 
BEPS project is the most extensive attempt to change international tax norms since the 
1920s. 5  At its core, the focus of the project is simple: it is meant to address features of 
the tax regimes of different countries that allow multinational corporations (MNCs) to 
shift income to low-tax or no-tax jurisdictions and expenses to high-tax jurisdictions, 
thereby eroding the corporate income tax base of higher-tax, often larger-market 
economies.6  The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
which the G-20 has tasked to undertake the BEPS project, is widely recognized to be 
“moving full-speed ahead with an initiative that will drastically change the international 
tax landscape.”7   
The institutional and procedural similarities that are developing between international tax 
law and international financial law as a result of the BEPS project reflect the heightened 
public salience of international tax matters, as well as the fact that international tax law, 
like international financial law—and unlike international trade law—lacks an 
international organization with substantial autonomy and authority.  A rich academic 
literature recounts when international financial regulatory diplomacy undertaken at the G-
20’s direction has been effective, and when it has not.  The bulk of that scholarly 
literature is broadly pessimistic about the range of issues that can be successfully 
addressed utilizing the soft law forums and procedures that characterize international 
financial law.8 
However, unlike most areas of international financial law, the international tax regime 
includes a substantial treaty-based component in the form of a network of more than 
3,800 bilateral tax treaties.9  The OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital 
(the “OECD Model Treaty”), although technically soft law, informs the content of this 
tax-treaty network in a way that is surprisingly self-enforcing.  Importantly, in practice, 
when changes are made to the OECD Model Treaty, to some degree those changes are 
incorporated into domestic law and given direct effect by tax administrators and courts, 
even if the relevant bilateral tax treaties are not renegotiated. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The BEPS project was launched when the G-20 asked the OECD to create the BEPS Action Plan. See 
Communiqué, G-20, Los Cabos Summit Leaders’ Declaration, at 7 (June 19, 2012), [hereinafter Los Cabos 
Communiqué], available at, http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2012/2012-0619-loscabos.html, 
http://perma.cc/J963-ZZ3D; OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD PUBLISHING 
22 (2013), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264202719-en [hereinafter BEPS Action Plan]. 
6 Pascal Saint-Amans & Raffaele Russo, OECD: What the BEPS are We Talking About?, 70 TAX NOTES 
INT'L 339 (Apr. 22, 2013). 
7 KPMG Survey:  Corporate Tax Leaders Skeptical That OECD Will Meet Goals of “BEPS” Action Plan 
by Deadline, KPMG, http://www.kpmg.com/us/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/press-
releases/pages/kpmg-survey-corporate-tax-leaders-skeptical-that-oecd-will-meet-goals-of-beps-action-plan-
by-deadline.aspx (last visited Oct. 29, 2014). 
8 For a more detailed discussion, see sources cited infra, notes 17-19, 28, and accompanying text.  
9 OECD/G-20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify 
Bilateral Tax Treaties, OECD PUBLISHING 11 (2014) [hereinafter Multilateral Instrument], available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264219250-en.  For a description of the purpose of bilateral tax treaties, 
please see infra, notes 173-174 and accompanying text.   
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This Article thus argues that in assessing the BEPS project and other future multilateral 
efforts to change the international tax regime, we must bifurcate our analysis of efforts to 
change the international tax regime into their Model Treaty–based and non-Model 
Treaty–based components.  Doing so allows us to understand the new regime for 
international tax governance at the multilateral level.  At a practical level, this 
understanding should lead observers to expect the Model Treaty–based parts of the BEPS 
project to be implemented, as well as many parts of the project focused on tax 
transparency.  Everything else is subject to substantial doubt.   
 
In arriving at these conclusions, the Article makes four contributions that link the 
international tax and international political economy literatures.  First, the article shows 
how high-salience crises can destabilize even long-established systems of international 
governance, substantially changing what can and cannot be achieved multilaterally.  In 
international tax, the political pressures brought to bear by the financial crisis swept aside 
a well-established and highly technocratic system of governance.  The substantial 
changes wrought to that system are not well appreciated, but are fundamental.  Second, 
the Article illustrates that international tax has now adopted the procedural soft-law forms 
of international financial law, including G-20 convocation, standard-setting, and 
monitoring.  This descriptive claim is new to the literature, and is essential to 
understanding the new regime for international tax governance at the multilateral level.  
Third, the Article draws lessons from the rich academic literature analyzing the evolution 
of international financial law and applies them to the enforceability of international tax 
agreements reached through international financial law-style forums and procedures. This 
critical perspective highlights some challenges the new regime for international tax 
governance faces. Fourth, the Article illustrates that tax treaty law differentiates the 
political economy of international tax law from that of international financial law in 
certain respects, because the OECD’s Model Treaty acts as an independent variable that 
affects the political economy of international tax affairs.  
 
The picture that emerges is of a new, bifurcated regime for international tax governance, 
one that involves two quite different and inconsistently effective mechanisms for 
coordinating international tax affairs. In demonstrating how the new international tax 
governance regime works, the Article contributes to the broader literature on international 
economic law by providing a high-profile example from international taxation of how 
underlying legal institutions can affect the prospect for international regulatory 
agreements to be implemented. 
 
Part I introduces the BEPS project, describes its components, and explains why the 
outcomes of the BEPS project should be important to a U.S. audience.  It then introduces 
international financial law and highlights the similarities between G-20 interventions in 
international financial law and G-20 interventions in international taxation since 2008.  
Part II gleans lessons from the international financial law literature regarding the 
potential efficacy of international economic governance projects and applies them to 
parts of the BEPS project that are not based on the OECD Model Treaty.  Part III 
describes why changes to the OECD Model Treaty are unusually self-enforcing for soft 
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law, such that the lessons of international financial law are not applicable to the Model 
Treaty–based portions of the international tax regime.  
I. International Tax and International Financial Law  
A. What Is the BEPS Project, and Why Should We Care About It? 
The G-20’s endorsement of the BEPS project inaugurated a unique era in international 
tax diplomacy.  International tax officials from across the OECD and G-20 member 
countries endeavored to set new standards in a wide range of technical areas of 
international tax, including in areas that had never been explored before multilaterally, in 
just two short years.10  The OECD claims that the outputs of their “BEPS Action Plan” 
will reinforce the coherence of the corporate income tax laws at the international level, 
primarily by combatting “double non-taxation,” insisting that a deduction on one side of a 
cross-border, intra-company transaction should match up with a taxable inclusion on the 
other side, realigning taxation and “substance” by requiring that MNCs recognize income 
in the jurisdictions where “value is created,” and providing improved transparency and a 
more stable compliance environment for all stakeholders.11  In contrast, some academic 
commentators characterize the fifteen items in the BEPS Action Plan as a laundry list of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 In short, the fifteen items in the BEPS Action Plan attempt to achieve the following:  1) establish new 
principles to eliminate certain mismatches between income in one jurisdiction and deduction in another in 
transactions between related parties, which result in deductions in one country without corresponding 
taxation in another, as well as the generation of multiple deductions or multiple foreign tax credits through 
a single expense (Action 2); 2) articulate best practices for anti-deferral rules that prevent the accrual of 
income in intermediary jurisdictions that are neither the country of source of a payment nor the country of 
residence of the parent of the entity receiving the payment (Action 3); 3) limit the use of debt to obtain 
excess interest deductions in high-tax jurisdictions (Action 4); 4) address “harmful tax practices” by 
defining when a tax regime that provides a reduced rate for income generated from intellectual property is 
not “harmful,” because it includes sufficient protections to ensure that the tax benefit is provided in the 
context of substantial activity, rather than mere income-shifting (Action 5); 5) limit tax treaty abuse and 
redefine tax nexus requirements (so-called permanent establishment rules) for the twenty-first century, and 
negotiate a multilateral instrument to implement these and other “treaty-based” measures (Actions 6, 7, and 
15); 6) change the transfer pricing guidelines to shift understandings of “arm’s length” pricing within 
multinational groups away from a respect for intragroup contracts and intragroup capital allocation and 
toward a “people functions” theory of value creation (Actions 8-10); 7) gather data on profit-shifting by 
multinationals in order to quantify the magnitude of base erosion and profit shifting problems and highlight 
improvements in a post-BEPS era (Action 11); 8) establish mandatory disclosure regimes and substantially 
expanded transfer pricing reporting requirements to cabin tax planning by MNCs and special tax deals 
made between an MNC and a sovereign, by relying on the chilling effect of transparency (Actions 5, 12, 
and 13); and 9) improve dispute resolution mechanisms for double taxation disputes (Action 14).  OECD, 
Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing (2013), available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264202719-en [hereinafter BEPS Action Plan].  A report entitled Addressing 
the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy effectively concluded that the “digital economy” is increasingly 
the entire global economy, and that therefore online activity could not be “ringfenced.”  As a result, 
concerns raised under “Action 1” of the BEPS Action Plan were folded into other parts of the BEPS 
project.  OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital 
Economy, OECD PUBLISHING (2014), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264218789-en.   
11 BEPS Action Plan, supra note 10.	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issues that were raised by various sovereigns but left unaddressed by the OECD over the 
last twenty years.12  
Regardless of whether one believes there is a coherent intellectual framework for the 
BEPS project, most agree that it is the most extensive effort to set multilateral 
international tax norms since work was undertaken to create such norms under the 
auspices of the League of Nations beginning in the 1920s.  Historically, however, U.S. 
tax lawyers and academics tended to dismiss multilateral discussion of international tax 
rules as a second-order matter.  The conventional wisdom was that the United States 
would ultimately have a veto over any outcome at the OECD, and would not agree to 
anything unfavorable to the United States.  Furthermore, the U.S. Congress would not 
pass laws to implement any multilateral agreement that was not consistent with U.S. 
policy interests, and until such laws were passed, the content of any multilateral 
agreement was irrelevant.   
Given this backdrop, one initial question is why academics and practitioners in the United 
States should care about the BEPS project or G-20 discussions about international tax 
issues in general.  An answer is that the United States’ highly atypical system for taxing 
the earnings of foreign subsidiaries of U.S.-resident multinational corporations (U.S. 
MNCs)13 has undermined the validity of the historic presumption that multilateral 
discussions would not constrain U.S. national interests. The planning structures U.S. 
MNCs must implement to reduce their effective tax rates to levels similar to those faced 
by their foreign competitors are highly reliant on the tax treatment of “foreign-to-foreign” 
cross-border transactions between related controlled foreign corporations within U.S. 
MNCs.14  As a result, from a U.S. MNC tax-planning perspective, foreign parliaments 
adopting new rules regarding the taxation of cross-border income can matter as much as 
or more than developments in the U.S. Congress.15   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 For a summary of the items in the BEPS Action Plan, see note 10, supra.  See e.g., Graeme Cooper, 
Coordinating Inconsistent Choices – The Problem of Hybrids, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14/108, 
SYDNEY LAW SCHOOL (Dec. 2014) (arguing that the BEPS action items lack conceptual coherence). 
13 See, e.g., Evolution of Territorial Tax Systems in the OECD, Report Prepared for Technology CEO 
Council, PWC 3 (Apr. 2, 2013), available at  
www.techceocouncil.org/clientuploads/reports/Report%20on%20Territorial%20Tax%20Systems_2013040
2b.pdf.   
14 Careful planning to take advantage of the deferral benefit allowed by the United States’ international tax 
rules allows U.S. MNCs to achieve tax burdens on their foreign-source income that are often similar to 
those faced by their foreign competitors, despite the fact that foreign statutory corporate tax rates are well 
below U.S. statutory corporate tax rates.  However, doing so requires substantial foreign-to-foreign tax 
planning.  See, e.g., Edward Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699 (2011).  A very different 
way to make this point is to observe that because the U.S. has the highest statutory corporate tax rate in the 
world, it generally does not make sense for a U.S.-based multinational to react to changes in foreign law by 
having a U.S. entity earn foreign-source income in place of a foreign affiliate. See Letter from Jeffrey 
Bergmann and Barry Slivinsky, Co-Chairs, Silicon Valley Tax Dir. Grp., to Sen. Ron Wyden, (then) 
Chairman, Senate Fin. Comm., and Sen. Orrin Hatch, (then) Ranking Member, Senate Fin. Comm. (Aug. 1, 
2014), available at http://svtdg.org/docs/svtdg_letter_to_wyden-hatch_on_tax_reform.pdf.   
15 The International Tax Bipartisan Tax Working Group of the U.S. Senate Finance Committee observed in 
June 2015 that “[a]lmost every U.S. multinational company and trade group that met with the working 	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One consequence of the tax-planning environment created by current U.S. law is that the 
United States has participated in negotiations in the BEPS project without its usual 
bargaining strength.  Despite being the world’s largest economy, in this context its 
negotiating power has been significantly eroded. Most countries understand that U.S. 
MNCs are reliant on “foreign-to-foreign” tax planning involving transactions between 
two or more of their foreign subsidiaries.  Thus, foreign sovereigns have more flexibility 
to change the rules of the game for U.S.-parented multinationals, without having to deal 
directly with U.S. authorities or address their bilateral treaty arrangements with the 
United States.16  Furthermore, other sovereigns may believe that the United States’ 
weakened bargaining position is likely to persist over the near to medium term, given 
gridlock on tax reform in Washington.  That perception further erodes the United States’ 
leverage in international negotiations.  At the same time, the history of G-7 and G-20 
initiatives in international economic affairs suggests that once those bodies engage an 
issue area within economic law, they tend not to disengage.17  As a result, diplomatic 
processes akin to the BEPS process are likely to be an ongoing feature of international 
tax affairs going forward. 
In this environment, in which U.S. influence over international tax norms has been 
reduced relative to historic norms (at least for the time being), and G-20 involvement in 
international tax affairs is likely to continue, it is important for U.S. practitioners, 
policymakers, and academics to develop a better understanding of how multilateral 
projects like the BEPS initiative work, and whether they can or will be effective.  As 
section I.B. below suggests, understanding the growing procedural and institutional 
similarities between international tax and international financial regulatory coordination 
provides a helpful starting point for that analysis. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
group expressed serious concerns about the impact the BEPS project will have . . . and, in fact, [they] are 
the intended targets of many of the new rules going into effect.”  UNITED STATES S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 
THE INTERNATIONAL TAX BIPARTISAN TAX WORKING GROUP REPORT 9-10 (2015).   
16 For instance, all U.S. tax treaties include a “mutual agreement procedure” that provides recourse to U.S. 
taxpayers to ask for assistance from the Internal Revenue Service when they believe that the actions of a 
treaty country result in or will lead to taxation not intended by the treaty between the two countries.  See 
Competent Authority Assistance, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-Taxpayers/Competent-
Authority-Assistance (last visited June 21, 2015).  However, in the case of transfer pricing adjustments 
imposed by a foreign sovereign, it is difficult for U.S. MNCs to invoke so-called “competent authority 
assistance” from the Internal Revenue Service when the transaction at issue does not involve a U.S. entity.  
Moreover, finance ministries abroad are aware that U.S. MNCs generally will not change their tax planning 
structures to take advantage of the protections provided by U.S. bilateral tax treaties as a means of 
defending against increased tax burdens imposed by source states.  The reason is that relying on a U.S. 
treaty would require subjecting the income in question to U.S. tax—that is to say, to the highest corporate 
tax rate in the developed world.   
17 The G-7 and G-20 have made and sustained open-ended commitments to involvement in at least a dozen 
areas of international economic law over the last two decades.  In contrast, the author’s investigations 
suggest only two areas where the G-7/G-20 committed to a subject and subsequently fully disengaged with 
the issue:  these are the Doha trade round, which the Leaders emphasized from 2008-2012, but set aside in 
2013 as Doha appeared to collapse; and IOSCO reporting on the functioning of credit default swap 
markets. See Goodbye Doha, Hello Bali, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 8, 2012), available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/21562196; OICV-IOSCO, THE CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP MARKET (2012) 
(concluding IOSCO’s research).  
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B. The International Financial Law Lens and the Growing Influence 
of the G-20  
For a quarter century, scholars have worked to explain the political economy and 
institutional architecture surrounding the creation and strengthening of international 
financial regulatory standards.18  Most international financial law is established through 
regulatory agreements that are not usually ratified by legislators, and are not legally 
binding on signatories in the traditional sense of international law.19  Instead, across a 
wide array of subfields of international financial regulation, one sees informal 
intergovernmental organizations that are not constituted by treaty and are not granted 
agency—legal or otherwise—to act in international affairs, but that nevertheless drive 
standard-setting agendas at the international level.20 
Although these organizations are constituted by, and issue, agreements and declarations 
with no formal sense of international obligation, they sometimes successfully function to 
coordinate regulation of complex cross-border financial matters internationally.21  The 
Basel Committee, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), 
the Financial Action Task Force, and the Financial Standards Board are representative 
examples.22  For instance, under the G-20’s influence, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision has imposed and refined standards of capital adequacy for internationally 
active financial institutions; IOSCO has set global standards and best practices for 
international securities regulation; and the Financial Action Task Force is known for its 
40+9 guidelines to ensure that financial institutions do not facilitate money laundering or 
terrorist financing.23  Each of these bodies devises standards for subsequent adoption or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Most of these scholars come from international relations or political economy backgrounds.  See, e.g., 
Ethan B. Kapstein, Resolving the Regulator’s Dilemma: International Coordination of Banking 
Regulations, 2 INT’L ORG. 43 (1989); DANIEL DREZNER, ALL POLITICS IS GLOBAL:  EXPLAINING 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY REGIMES (Princeton Univ. Press, 2007); TONY PORTER, GLOBALIZATION 
AND FINANCE (Wiley, 2005); DAVID SINGER, REGULATING CAPITAL: SETTING STANDARDS FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (Cornell Univ. Press, 2007); ANDREW WALTER, GOVERNING 
FINANCE:  EAST ASIA’S ADOPTION OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS (Cornell Univ. Press, 2008); Thomas 
Oatley & Robert Nabors, Redistributive Cooperation, Market Failure, Wealth Failures and the Basel 
Accord, 52 INT’L ORG. 35 (1998).  However, key contributions by legal scholars have shown the way in 
which law acts as an independent variable in shaping outcomes in financial regulation.  See e.g., CHRIS 
BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2012); 
Pierre-Hugues Verdier, The Political Economy of International Financial Regulation, 88 IND. L. REV. 1405 
(2013).  
19 BRUMMER, supra note 17; David Andrew Singer, Capital Rules: The Domestic Politics of International 
Regulatory Harmonization, 58 INT’L ORG. 531, 535 (2004). 
20 Note that while the OECD is a formal organization with legal standing under international law, the 
“OECD plus G-20”—the body that is implementing the BEPS project—has no such status.	  
21 ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 38 (2004).   
22 Other “soft law” financial standard-setters include the International Accounting Standards Board, and the 
Committee on Payments and Settlement Systems (known for its Recommendations for Central 
Counterparties and Core Principles for Systematically Important Payments Systems).  These have narrower 
mandates than IOSCO or the BCBS.  The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) also has a narrow mandate, 
but is notable because of the efficacy of its peer review mechanism and the enforcement pressures 
associated with those peer reviews.   
23 BRUMMER, supra note 17, at 63–69.  
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implementation by national regulators. The Financial Standards Board has developed 
standards for macro-prudential regulation while also coordinating the activities of other 
international financial regulatory bodies. None of these organizations have any formal 
legal basis in the sense of traditional international law, but each has influence on 
international regulatory coordination in their issue area in member and non-member 
states alike.24   
Each of the various standard-setters in specific sub-areas of international financial law 
depends on the G-20.  At least since the financial crisis, the G-20 has acted as the primary 
agenda-setter for their work, defining broad strategic objectives for international financial 
regulation. The G-20 not only requests international coordination around the standards 
created by the standard-setters it convenes, but frequently establishes monitoring bodies, 
enforcement vehicles, and technical assistance providers (“enablers”) to support 
compliance with the new international standard.  Thus, a monitoring body may determine 
whether national regulators are complying with a standard, potentially imposing 
discipline. Enforcement mechanisms are often established or threatened by the G-20 and 
tied to the monitoring bodies’ judgments. Finally, jurisdictions that lack the human 
capital needed to meet the standards may be offered technical assistance.25 Taken 
together, the G-20 and its associated standard-setters, monitoring bodies, enforcement 
mechanisms, and enablers create a soft-law meta-framework for international financial 
law.26 A key feature of this framework is a “top-down” architecture, in which G-20 
convocation and agenda setting provides the impetus for law- and regulation-making. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Id. at 63-69, 76.   
25 Id. at 61–114. Before the G-20’s emergence as a major player in 2008, the G-7 had played a similar role. 
26 See Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (And How It Doesn’t), 99 GEO. L.J. 257 
(2011). The diagram below borrows from Brummer, supra note 17, at 68. 
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Implementers 
•  National 
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In contrast to the G-20–centric process for addressing international coordination in 
international finance, multilateral dialogue about international tax matters was 
historically centered on the Committee on Fiscal Affairs at the OECD, a body whose 
membership consisted of leading technocrats with authority over international tax affairs 
in their respective countries.27  Topics for consideration by the Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs were most often generated by means of prior, often multiyear discussions in the 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs’ subsidiary bodies, staffed by lower-level technocrats.28  
Given this “bottom-up” process, multilateral agreement on changes to international tax 
norms happened slowly and deliberately, with significant OECD projects involving even 
moderate changes to agreed-upon principles often taking as much as a decade from onset 
to completion.29  
 
All that began to change in 2009.  At their London meeting that year, the leaders of the 
G-2030 endorsed a “more cooperative” international tax environment.31  For two years, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Hugh Ault, Reflections on the Role of the OECD in Developing International Tax Norms, 34 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 757, 760 (2009).  For instance, the representative of the United States at the CFA has usually been 
the International Tax Counsel of the United States or the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury 
(International Tax).  Id.  
28 Ault, supra note 30, at 761. 
29 Id. at 762-63.  For example, the OECD’s Report on Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments 
was over a decade in the making.  Id. 
30 The G-20 describes itself as “the premier forum for its members’ international economic cooperation and 
decision-making.” 
31 The G-20’s London Declaration explicitly committed to a “new cooperative tax environment,” and that 
commitment has been reiterated at each subsequent G-20 meeting. Communiqué, G-20, Declaration on 
Strengthening the Financial System—London, at 5 (Apr. 2, 2009), [hereinafter London Communiqué], 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/g7-g20/Documents /London %20April% 
202009%20Fin_Deps_Fin_Reg_Annex_020409_-_1615_final.pdf, http://perma.cc/4NG7-M657.   
Simplified (Historic) Architecture of International Tax Multilateralism!
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the G-20 limited its efforts to the area of tax administrative cooperation.32  Then, in 2011, 
the G-20 added a tax “pillar” to its economic development agenda.33  Finally, in 2012, the 
G-20 expressed an interest in substantive international tax rules governing the taxation of 
the cross-border activities of multinational corporations.  As its engagement with 
international tax grew, G-20 statements about international tax matters both paralleled the 
structure and borrowed from the architecture and tools used in G-20 efforts to shape 
international financial law.34  
Consider the G-20 Leaders’ Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System in 
2009.35  In that document, the G-20 included a section on “Tax Havens” in which they 
emphasized that they had agreed on a toolbox of counter-measures for jurisdictions that 
did not meet international standards for tax transparency, much as they had done in 
earlier years when addressing money laundering and terrorist financing through the 
financial system.36  Simultaneously, the G-20 requested that an existing OECD-affiliated 
body known as the Global Forum on Transparency and Administrative Cooperation in 
Tax Matters (“Global Forum”) be transformed into a peer-review organization of the type 
commonly seen in international financial law.37  The reformed Global Forum was 
incorporated into a “peer review trifecta” based on the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF) model, which also strengthened the peer review mechanisms used by the 
Financial Standards Forum (now the Financial Standards Board).  
Thereafter, the G-20 brought the area of administrative cooperation in international tax 
law fully within the rubric of international financial law, addressing it as part of the 
international financial law portion of its communiqués and overseeing the peer-review 
mechanisms therein as one piece of a broader financial law peer-review package. 38  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Cross-border administrative cooperation in tax matters was the one area of international tax matters in 
which the G-20—and previously the G-7—had maintained some level of continuing involvement since 
1997.  See Communiqué, G-8, Confronting Global Economic and Financial Challenges—Denver, at para. 
33 (1997), available at http://www.g8.fr/evian/english/navigation/g8_documents/archives_from_previous 
_summits/denver_summit_-_1997/confronting_global_economic_and_financial_challenges.html, 
http://perma.cc/JV7Q-F723; London Communiqué, supra note 34, at 4–5.  See also Itai Grinberg, The 
Battle Over Taxing Offshore Accounts, 60 UCLA L. REV. 313–317 (2012). Eventually the G-20 Finance 
Ministers’ interest in transparency and information exchange expanded into a commitment to developing a 
global standard on automatic information exchange that would make information on offshore accounts 
broadly available to tax administrations around the world. Communiqué, G-20, Meeting of Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors (Apr. 19, 2013), available at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2013/2013 
-0419-finance.html. 
33 See Communiqué, G-20, Seoul Summit Leaders’ Declaration (Nov. 11–12, 2010), [hereinafter Seoul 
Communiqué], available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/international/Documents/1%20%20FINAL%20SEOUL %20COMMUNIQUE.pdf. 
34 C.f. Eccleston, infra note 41, at 49 (discussing how the most significant consequence of the financial 
crisis was the transformation of the G-20 into a body that took on new agendas and functions).   
35 London Communiqué, supra note 34, at 4. 
36 Id. 
37 Id.  
38 For extended discussions of these developments see Grinberg, supra note 35 as well as RICHARD 
ECCLESTON, THE DYNAMICS OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE:  THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, THE OECD, 
AND THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL TAX COOPERATION 86-99 (2012).   
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Thus, at the G-20’s direction, the Global Forum developed a “terms of reference” and 
created a “methodology” for conducting peer reviews to determine whether countries 
were meeting global standards for tax information exchange upon request.39  In order to 
successfully promulgate the new standards for information exchange upon request 
worldwide, the Global Forum searched for enablers that would help implement the 
standard.40  These tools were all imported from international financial law, and over four 
years an international financial law–style meta-architecture, involving a standard-setter, a 
monitoring mechanism, enablers, and enforcement threats, was established for 
information exchange in cross-border tax administrative cooperation.41   
In 2012, the G-20 broadened its interest in international tax affairs to encompass the 
taxation of MNCs when it identified base erosion and profit shifting by multinational 
enterprises as a threat to the G-20’s own public fiscs in the midst of politically unpopular 
austerity.42  It requested that the OECD develop a plan to address the newly labeled 
BEPS phenomenon, and the OECD subsequently produced its BEPS Action Plan in a 
specially created working group incorporating officials from all non-OECD G-20 
countries.  The G-20 then endorsed that action plan, simultaneously mandating that the 
OECD provide “regular reporting on the development of proposals and recommendations 
to tackle the 15 issues identified in the action plan.”43   
Again, the rhetoric and form of the G-20’s efforts to expand its involvement in 
international tax matters to encompass substantive rules for taxing the cross-border 
activities of multinational enterprises shared the trappings of international financial law.44  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Id. See OECD, Terms of Reference: To Monitor and Review Progress towards Transparency and 
Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (2010), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/37/42/44824681.pdf (describing in detail international standards for 
information exchange upon request in tax matters); Global Forum on Transparency & Exch. Of Info. For 
Tax Purposes, OECD, Revised Methodology for Peer Reviews and Non-Members Reviews (2011), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/44824721.pdf (detailing how to conduct reviews).   
40 The OECD lacked sufficient capacity or experience engaging in technical assistance to less developed 
countries, so the Global Forum leadership sought additional assistance from multilateral organizations 
focused on development, and in particular focused on the tax team at the World Bank.  They did so to 
fulfill another G-20 mandate:  to treat tax information exchange as a mechanism by which to help build 
sustainable revenue bases for inclusive growth and social equity by improving developing country tax 
administration systems.  Seoul Communiqué, supra note 36, at para. 51(h).  
41  See generally Itai Grinberg, Taxing Capital Income in Emerging Countries: Will FATCA Open the 
Door?, 5 World Tax J. 325-367 (2013). Shortly thereafter the Global Forum began to import the peer 
review architecture into the area of automatic information exchange, as opposed to information exchange 
upon request, as part of a broader effort to enforce the OECD’s Common Reporting Standard.  The 
Common Reporting System builds on U.S. automatic information exchange efforts developed under the 
auspices of legislation known as FATCA (Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act).  
42 The G-20 addressed the BEPS issue as part of its declaration about “reforming the financial sector and 
fostering financial inclusion.”  Los Cabos Communiqué, supra note 5, at 7. 
43 Communiqué, G-20, Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors—Moscow (Jul. 19–20, 
2013), available at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2013/2013-0720-finance.html.   
44 Indeed, the 2012 communiqué that launched the BEPS project described it as part of the G-20’s efforts in 
“reforming the financial sector and fostering financial inclusion.”  Los Cabos Communiqué, supra note 5, 
at 7.  Separately, it is worth noting that at about the time the BEPS project was launched, Pascal St. Amans, 
the leading official of the Global Forum, became the leader of the OECD’s Centre for Tax Policy and 	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Rhetorically, the G-20 justified its expanded interest in substantive international tax rules 
as necessary to ensure the perception of fairness vis-à-vis the fiscal burden borne by 
citizens in an era of public austerity.  Meanwhile, in form, the “action items” endorsed by 
the G-20 consisted almost exclusively of soft-law measures.45  In other words, as is the 
case in the G-20’s international financial law agenda, the BEPS Action Plan anticipated 
countries agreeing on recommendations and instruments that lack formal legal obligation.  
Moreover, the G-20 regularly addressed the BEPS issue in the part of its communiqué 
devoted to international finance (even though the focus of the BEPS project is not 
primarily on the financial sector).  Taken together, these features suggest that at the G-20 
deputies’ level, international tax may have come to be thought of—procedurally—as 
analogous to “international financial law.”46  Now, in 2015, as the BEPS project is 
scheduled to conclude, OECD and government speakers talk of building systems to 
monitor compliance with best practices and incorporate peer reviews of whether 
minimum BEPS standards are being met.47  These are the mechanisms that characterize 
international financial law.  They were not often used in international tax in the past, but 
now detailed discussions about establishing institutional mechanisms akin to those found 
in international financial law are beginning.48   
One lesson of potentially general application that emerges from this story of regime 
change in international tax is that high-salience crises can change even long-established 
processes of multilateral decision-making in technocratic areas of international economic 
law. Appreciating those changes can help analysts focus on the right actors and decision-
making levers when evaluating international developments in a given area of 
international economic governance. 
II. Outside the OECD Model Treaty: Lessons from International Financial Law  
Scholars have worked for many years to explain the political economy and institutional 
architecture surrounding the creation and strengthening of international financial 
standards and regulation in the absence of a formal international law forum for multi-
jurisdictional coordination.  Their analysis focuses largely on the interests and exercise of 
power by leading states, the interplay between regulators, industry groups, and elected 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Administration, where he brought the experience and some of the international financial law–style practices 
that were utilized at the Global Forum into his new role.   
45 Indeed, only the proposal for a multilateral instrument for tax matters crosses the threshold into a binding 
formal commitment made by sovereigns, and unlike any other part of the BEPS Action Plan, this measure 
is expressly reserved for “interested parties”:  in other words, it is limited to a coalition of the willing.   
46 At the same time, G-20 communiqués have begun to recognize the distinctions between international 
taxation writ large and financial sector regulation.  Notably, when refining the charter for the FSB, which 
acts as an overarching coordinator for G-20 efforts in international financial regulation, the G-20 did not 
include the OECD’s CFA as one of the standard-setting bodies that engages with the FSB.   
47 See, e.g., Post-2015, OECD International Tax Conference (June 2015) (slides on file with author);  See 
also Stephanie Soong Johnston, Differing Approaches Pose a Key Post-BEPS Challenge, Panelists Say, 
TAX NOTES TODAY (June 12, 2015) (quoting comments of Brian Ernewein, general director of tax policy 
for the Canadian Department of Finance).   
48 See, e.g., Post-BEPS Environment, OECD International Tax Conference (June 2015) (slides on file with 
author).  
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policymakers at the domestic level, and the impact of trans-governmental networks of 
regulators as well as non-state actors.49  Within that context, legal scholars describe the 
ways that soft international financial law informs the behavior of a host of regulatory and 
financial actors.50 
In this Part, I argue that five broad lessons from the international financial regulatory 
literature may be applicable to analysis of the BEPS project and future multilateral efforts 
in international tax law. First, as the political salience of an issue increases,51 the 
importance of traditional understandings among transnational regulatory communities 
declines.  Rational calculations about domestically determined national interests (logics 
of consequences) increasingly trump technocratically constructed understandings of 
global policy coherence (logics of appropriateness) as decision-making moves from a 
technocratic to a political level. 52   Second, in this environment, soft international 
economic law is much more likely to be effective when preferences are aligned and 
distributive problems are largely absent among the major economies.53  Third, even when 
incentives are not aligned between major state actors, “agreements” can occur when 
political pressures demand it.  However, for those agreements to be implemented, there 
must be either the exercise of coercion by a sufficiently powerful subset of leading 
economies or market dynamics that allow a subset of states to impose a standard without 
affirmatively coercing other states. In this context, when nation-states do not identify 
distributive problems at the outset, path dependence may also be important.  Finally, the 
ultimate efficacy of agreements often depends on the ease of evaluating compliance and 
the extent to which enforcement mechanisms work.  Mock compliance is an option, 
including for smaller economies, in various circumstances.  As explained in Part III, these 
lessons are most applicable to multilateral efforts outside the scope of the OECD Model 
Treaty.   
Of course, there are limits to analogies between international financial law and 
international tax law. For example, the balance of power among stakeholders and the 
perceived sources of influence are not identical.54  Moreover, analysis by analogy to past 
events in other policy areas cannot account for the particular predispositions of individual 
decision makers, whose choices are often a key variable in international diplomatic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Eric Helleiner & Stefano Pagliari, The End of an Era in International Financial Regulation, 65 INT’L 
ORG. 169, 169–200  (2011). 
50 BRUMMER, supra note 17.  
51 See note 64, infra, for a definition of political salience as used herein. 
52 See STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 51 (1999) (arguing that in the 
international system, when decisions are made by actors subject to or cognizant of domestic political 
pressures, logics of consequences, meaning rational calculation designed to maximize a given set of 
unexplained national preferences, tend to trump logics of appropriateness, meaning, for example, regulator 
community understandings about policy coherence and consequent “appropriate” courses of action for 
sovereigns).   
53 For example, regulatory agreements intended to force public disclosure of information can create non-
excludable benefits that are also largely non-rival among G-20 countries, thereby approaching a global 
public good, which facilitates agreement.   
54 As described in Part I, U.S. influence in international tax affairs is, at least at present, weaker than it is in 
international financial law. 
WORKING DRAFT, COMMENTS WELCOME  	  
	   14 
processes.55  Finally, taxation is more explicitly distributional than is financial regulation; 
tax revenue represents the “lifeblood of the state.”56  Thus, countries tend to view 
autonomy in tax policy as a core attribute of their authority and may protect “tax 
sovereignty” more forcefully than sovereignty in international financial regulatory 
matters.  Nevertheless, when a G-20–convened economic diplomacy effort (like the 
BEPS project) encourages domestic adoption of international tax law by way of soft-law 
recommendations backed by the meta-architecture of international financial law, 
reflecting on the lessons of international financial governance may provide a useful 
perspective.57 
A. Political Salience Can Simultaneously Broaden the Agenda and 
Lower the Efficacy of Transnational Regulatory Networks 
Before the financial crisis, there was relatively little public awareness of both 
international financial law and international tax law.58  Indeed, until recently, most 
literature on international financial law assumed that the complexity of these matters 
would ensure that politicians remained largely uninvolved.  The idea that leading 
politicians would attempt to comprehensively address the multilateral dimension of 
international tax affairs in response to public pressure was so remote that the literature 
never seriously considered the question.59  As a result, subject-matter specialists in 
government and industry were thought to address issues in a relative vacuum.60  In this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 C.f. RICHARD N. HAASS, HONEY AND VINEGAR:  INCENTIVES, SANCTIONS, AND FOREIGN POLICY (2000). 
56 Grinberg, supra note 35, at 354.  
57 The lessons garnered from international financial law are particularly helpful in part because the way 
international tax diplomacy works is so deeply understudied.  Philipp Genschel & Thomas Rixen, Settling 
and Unsettling the Transnational Legal Order of International Taxation, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL 
ORDERS 154 (Gregory Shaffer & Terrance Halliday, eds., 2015); Diane Ring, International Tax Relations: 
Theory and Implications, 60 TAX L. REV. 83 (2007). One noteworthy exception to that general point comes 
from the literature on the OECD’s (largely unsuccessful) Harmful Tax Competition project from the late 
1990s.  That project is distinguishable from BEPS for three important reasons. First, the BEPS project does 
not seek to develop different standards for OECD and non-OECD countries and therefore does not 
explicitly create a group of insiders and outsiders.  Second, BEPS focuses primarily on constraining private 
sector rather than government behavior.  Third, BEPS is much more politically salient than was the HTCP, 
and therefore much more heavily driven by G-20 processes, rather than OECD processes.  In each of these 
respects BEPS is more like international financial law than HTCP, and therefore I do not focus on the 
literature regarding the HTCP in this paper.   
58 Id. at 98.  See also Stefano Pagliari, Public Salience and International Financial Regulation, Explaining 
the International Regulation of OTC Derivatives, Rating Agencies, and Hedge Funds 8-9 (2013).  
Similarly, the claim by the OECD that international tax issues are at a high point of political prominence is 
in part an acknowledgement that they had no political prominence before 2008.  See Angel Gurria, OECD 
Secretary-General, Remarks delivered at Joint Press Conference on the G-20 Tax Agenda (Sept. 20, 2014), 
http://www.oecd.org/g20/topics/taxation/g20-tax-agenda-press-conference.htm (stating that “International 
tax evasion and avoidance has been a headline issue for more than 5 years”).  
59 See Hugh J. Ault, Wolfgang Schon, & Stephen E. Shay, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting: A Roadmap 
for Reform, 68 BULLETIN FOR INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 275, 276 (2014).  
60  Pagliari, supra note 60, at 8-9.  This assumption of constructivist analysis echoes Anne-Marie 
Slaughter’s broader argument that transgovernmental regulatory networks foster more extensive and more 
effective international cooperation by “disaggregating states.”  SLAUGHTER, supra note 19. For another 
celebratory account of transnational regulatory networks, see work by Kal Raustiala, who argues that the 	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context, the practices and expectations of the community of regulators from other nation-
states, as well as private-sector advisors, could be powerful motivators in reaching 
agreement among the relevant technocrats.61 
Recent analysis suggests that this constructivist approach to understanding cross-border 
regulatory cooperation—which focuses on notions of policy coherence and fairness 
developed among national regulators participating together in a transnational regulatory 
community (logics of appropriateness)—is less helpful in understanding international 
economic regulatory developments as the salience of an issue increases.62  For instance, 
since the financial crisis, most observers agree that domestic political pressures have been 
instrumental in shaping international financial law.63   
Indeed, numerous scholars cite politicization and domestic pressures as an important 
reason that the regulatory agenda of international financial law has broadened in the last 
five years.64  Thus, when international financial law became more politicized after the 
financial crisis, the G-20 pushed regulators to revisit global capital standards (Basel III), 
identify and heighten prudential standards for global systemically important banks and 
insurers, develop cross-border resolution mechanisms to attempt to limit taxpayer losses, 
and expand international regulatory discussions of risks emanating from hedge funds, 
OTC derivatives, and other features of the shadow-banking system.  Technical specialists 
had identified all of these issues before the financial crisis, but political will was required 
for them to become part of regular discussions among cross-border regulators.  
Similarly, the OECD’s BEPS project has substantially broadened the international tax 
agenda.  Agreed-upon principles on addressing hybrid instruments,65 best practices for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
disaggregation of the state through direct international cooperation among national regulatory agencies was 
a logical response to changes in the regulatory environment brought about by technological innovation, the 
expansion of domestic regulation, and economic globalization.  Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of 
International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 1 (2002).  See also, Helleiner & Pagliari, supra note 52, at 174. 
61 See PORTER, supra note 17.  See, e.g., Marc Quintyn & Michael William Taylor, Should Financial Sector 
Regulators Be Independent?, 32 IMF ECON. ISSUES (2004), WALTER, supra note 17. See also Culpepper 
2001 p. 145; BRUMMER, supra note 17; HELLEINER, infra note 72, at 84. 
62 Helleiner & Pagliari, supra note 52. Salience in the sense I intend to use the word depends on the extent 
to which an event raises public awareness of a given regulatory domain in the countries that dominate the 
international regulatory policymaking in the relevant area.  Note that salience is not directly related to the 
severity of the crisis, the role that the specific sector has in originating that crisis, or the likelihood that a 
given regulatory framework will address the issues over which there is heightened public awareness.  In 
other words, perception and reality may diverge.   
63 See, e.g., Eric Helleiner & Stefano Pagliari, Between the Storms:  Patterns in Global Financial 
Governance, 2001–2007, in GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION THIRTY YEARS ON:  FROM REFORM TO 
CRISIS (Geoffrey Underhill, Jasper Blom, & Daniel Mügge, eds., 2010). 
64 See id.  
65 OECD (2014) Public Discussion Draft BEPS Action 2: Neutralise the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch 
Arrangements, available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/treaties/hybrid-mismatch-arrangements-discussion-
draft-treaty-issues-march-2014.pdf (“BEPS Action 2”). 
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controlled foreign corporation rules, 66  recommendations for limitations on interest 
expense deductibility,67 and mandatory disclosure regimes intended to cabin both MNC 
tax planning and special tax deals made between an MNC and a sovereign68 are among 
the items that the G-20 put on the multilateral tax agenda.  Again, specialists had 
identified most of these items before the G-20 entered the fray, but they required political 
backing to be elevated to a level where serious dialogue would take place among 
international tax technocrats. 
However, even as high public interest has broadened the international regulatory agenda 
in both international finance and international tax law, it has also driven more political 
responses to perceived problems.  Public attention pressured technocrats to adopt policies 
their respective publics were believed to favor, in part because heightened political 
salience substantially increased the likelihood that elected officials (and high-level 
political appointees) would become directly involved in negotiations, rather than 
delegating most or all authority to technocrats.69   
In international financial law, higher public salience increased the propensity for broad 
agreements of principle among the strongest states.  However, those agreements around 
high principles often left key issues unresolved.70 Then, as the distributive consequences 
associated with addressing these issues became clear, the G-20 process and related 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66  OECD (2015) Public Discussion Draft BEPS Action 3: Strengthening CFC Rules, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/aggressive/discussion-draft-beps-action-3-strengthening-CFC-rules.pdf (“BEPS 
Action 3”). 
67 OECD (2015) Public Discussion Draft BEPS Action 4: Interest Deductions and Other Financial 
Payments, available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/aggressive/discussion-draft-action-4-interest-
deductions.pdf (“BEPS Action 4”). 
68 OECD (2015) Public Discussion Draft BEPS Action 12: Mandatory Disclosure Rules, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/aggressive/discussion-draft-action-12-mandatory-disclosure-rules.pdf (“BEPS 
Action 12”); OECD (2014) Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking into Account 
Transparency and Substances, available at http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/download/2314271e.pdf?expires=1438480449&id=id&accname=guest&checksum
=5E5B98E80AD81B6261DB4333202859CF (“BEPS Action 5”).  Chapter 4(B) of Action 5 discusses 
mandatory disclosure of private rulings. 
69 Id. at 94.  The leading international tax officials from countries like Australia, China, and the United 
Kingdom now routinely comment at public conferences about the importance of public sentiment in 
shaping their policy positions.  Academics have differed on the mechanism of action by which high public 
salience may affect policymaking in the international financial regulatory space. In David Singer’s telling, 
crises may create bureaucratic incentives for regulators to take action in order to appease their political 
masters. DAVID SINGER, REGULATING CAPITAL: SETTING STANDARDS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM 30 (Cornell Univ. Press, 2007). Oatley and Nabors argue that elected politicians rather than 
regulators are more likely to play a direct role in shaping the content of national and international 
regulatory policies after crises. Thomas Oatley & Robert Nabors, Redistributive Cooperation, Market 
Failure, Wealth Failures and the Basel Accord, 52 INT’L ORG. 35 (1998). See also Pierre-Hugues Verdier, 
Transnational Regulatory Networks and their Limits, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 113, 127 (2009) (contending 
that when an issue is salient, politicians may intervene to reshape what would otherwise be the activities of 
a transnational regulatory network); Pagliari, supra note 60, at 9 (similar).   
70 ERIC HELLEINER, THE STATUS QUO CRISIS 5, 17 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2014) (discussing how despite 
bold initiatives posited by the G-20 in the immediate wake of the crisis, transformative change failed to 
occur). 
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technocratic work revealed a substantial propensity to elide key issues.  To provide just 
one example, the IMF has observed that “consensus has been reached on a framework” 
for addressing cross-border bank resolution, but “important details still need to be worked 
out.  As yet, orderly resolution of systemically important cross-border banks is not a 
feasible option.”71  
In international tax, as the salience of the issues increased, preexisting norms of discourse 
developed by the community of international tax regulators were often wiped out.72  
Logics of appropriateness developed among regulators over time gave way to political 
and economic pressures internal to states in determining most regulators’ behavior, both 
on the international diplomatic stage and in connection with unilateral regulatory 
decisions made without regard to any international consensus. 73   To date the 
consequences are perhaps seen most clearly in the area of substantive transfer-pricing 
guidance.   
Transfer-pricing regimes provide the conceptual framework for pricing intercompany 
transactions, which function to allocate income between the various tax jurisdictions in 
which an MNC operates.  The “arm’s length” principle of international tax enforcement 
is designed to prevent MNCs from using transfer pricing to create tax advantages for 
themselves because they operate in group form rather than conducting business as 
independent enterprises transacting with one another across borders, and therefore can 
dictate the pricing of inter-firm cross-border transactions.   
For more than thirty years, the arm’s length principle represented a consensual solution to 
the problem of allocating tax between different parts of an MNC.74  Although the mantra 
of “arm’s length” masked real disagreement, and members of the transfer pricing 
practitioner community often held the view that there was substantial controversy as to 
the proper implementation of the arm’s length standard, the range of interpretation was, 
in practice, reasonably narrow.  Major transfer-pricing disputes arose with regularity,75 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 IMF, Cross-Border Bank Resolution:  Recent Developments (June 2, 2014). 
72 See, e.g., remarks of Bob Stack, June 11, 2015, at the OECD-USCIB conference in Washington DC, 
bemoaning that “countries are going their own way,” and emphasizing that he wanted everyone to ask the 
question “do we have a set of shared rules, or don’t we?”.  Notes of remarks taken by author.  See also 
Robert B. Stack, U.S. Treasury Official Discusses the Progress and Future of the OECD BEPS Project, 78 
TAX NOTES INT’L 1193, 1196 (June 29, 2015).   
73 The United Kingdom’s policy positions taken in connection with the BEPS project, in terms of publicly 
expressed support by politicians for multilateral action in the face of domestic political pressure, and 
unilateral implementation of their Diverted Profits Tax despite the clear deviation from global norms, make 
the UK an exemplar of this model of action.   
74 John Neighbour, Transfer pricing, Keeping it at arm’s length, OECD OBSERVER (Apr. 21, 2002), 
http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.php/aid/670/Transfer_pricing:_Keeping_it_at_arms_length
.html.  Of course, important academic critiques and alternative proposals existed before the onset of the 
BEPS project.  E.g., Reuven Avi-Yonah, Splitting the Unsplittable: Toward a Formulary Approach to 
Allocating Residuals Under Profit Split (Univ. of Michigan Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper 
Series, No. 378. Working Paper, 2013) (proposing that the OECD use formulary apportionment to allocate 
residual profit of the “profit split method”). 
75 The transfer pricing dispute between the United States and the United Kingdom, involving the valuation 
of certain marketing vs. manufacturing intangibles of Glaxo-Smith Kline provides just one particularly 	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but they were addressed within a framework that largely respected intercompany 
contracts and the concept of allocation of risk within a multinational group.76  Whether 
one views that outcome as good policy or not, the relatively clear intellectual boundaries 
for these disputes were an outgrowth of the fact that discussion of transfer pricing was 
limited to tax administrators and other specialists.77   
In the last few years, however, transfer pricing and the arm’s length standard in particular 
have become a source of substantial conceptual controversy.78  The arm’s length standard 
drew attention from many sources outside the transfer-pricing bar, including numerous 
exposés in the popular press, 79  legislative hearings in multiple jurisdictions, 80  and 
sustained attention from advocacy groups claiming the mantle of “civil society.”81  As a 
result, transfer pricing became a subject of discussion among high-level elected officials 
for the first time.82  In the process, preexisting norms developed by the community of 
transfer-pricing specialists came under heavy (perhaps deserving) scrutiny.  The BEPS 
project then endorsed the idea that the existing transfer pricing guidelines were broken, 
but has heretofore failed to reach meaningful consensus on a clearly delineated 
alternative.  Views around the level of deference to be given intergroup contractual 
arrangements diverged substantially, the consensus on the scope for recharacterizing 
intergroup transactions frayed, the consensus on respecting intergroup equity 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
large dispute among an innumerable number of examples. See Audrey Nutt, Glaxo, U.S. Settle Transfer 
Pricing Dispute, 43 TAX NOTES INT’L 956 (Sept. 18, 2006).   
76 See Matthias Schroger, Transfer Pricing: Next Steps in the International Debate in TAX POLICY 
CHALLENGES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 310-12 (Karoline Spies & Raffaele Petruzzi, eds., 2014). 
77 Indeed, one refrain among some tax practitioners for many years was that the arm’s length standard was 
the worst possible answer for transfer pricing, except for all proposed alternatives. 
78 See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Between Formulary Apportionment and the OECD Guidelines: A 
Proposal for Reconciliation, 2 WORLD TAX J. 3, 3 (2010) (arguing that while debate quieted with regard to 
the arm’s length standard after the adoption of the 1995 regulations and OECD guidelines, the arm’s length 
standard is unworkable and should be replaced by formulary apportionment); TJN Statement on Transfer 
Pricing, TAX JUSTICE NETWORK (Mar. 21, 2012), http://taxjustice.blogspot.com/2012/03/tjn-statement-on-
transfer-pricing.html (asserting that the “OECD’s theory of the arm’s length principle no longer applies to 
multinational enterprises which are highly integrated”).  
79  E.g., Companies Dodge $60 Billion in Taxes Even Tea Party Condemns, BLOOMBERG.COM, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-05-13/american-companies-dodge-60-billion-in-taxes-
even-tea-party-would-condemn  (last visited May 17, 2015) (“Transfer pricing lets companies such as 
Forest, Oracle Corp., Eli Lilly & Co. and Pfizer Inc., legally avoid some income taxes by converting sales 
in one country to profits in another”). 
80  Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code: Hearing before the Permanent Subcomm. on 
Investigations, 113th Cong. 2 (2013) (statement of Sen. Levin 2, Member, S. Comm. on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs) (noting, in conjunction with Sen. McCain, how “Apple effectively 
shifts billions of dollars in profits offshore, profits that under one section of the Tax Code should 
nonetheless be subject to U.S. taxes, but through a complex process avoids those taxes”). 
81 Transfer Pricing, TAXJUSTICE.NET, http://www.taxjustice.net/topics/corporate-tax/transfer-pricing/ (last 
visited May 17, 2015) (deploring the arm’s length standard and collecting sources that advocate for 
formulary apportionment).  
82  See Stephen Timms, Financial Secretary to Treas. UK, address at OECD Tax & Development 
Conference, Paris (Jan. 27, 2010); G-20, Cannes Summit Final Declaration—Building our Common 
Future: Renewed Collective Action for the Benefit of All, Cannes Summit (Nov. 4, 2011), available at 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2011/2011-cannes-declaration-111104-en.html. See also Arun Jaitley, Hon. 
Fin. Minister, India, A Tax Vision for India, Peterson Institute for International Economics (Apr. 16, 2015).   
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contributions declined, and disputes among government officials about whether value 
creation in cross-border transactions undertaken by multinationals should be attributed to 
capital, labor, the market, or even government support are now aired routinely and 
publicly.83  On all of these issues, it seems unlikely that new agreements that are clear 
enough to avoid disputes will be reached.  At the same time, enormous political pressures 
coming from the highest levels of government and the G-20 mean that some sort of 
outcome in the transfer-pricing work of the BEPS project is a political necessity.  The 
likely result is a reliance on high levels of constructive ambiguity buried in many pages 
of technocratic language in the transfer-pricing outputs of the BEPS project.   
An important reason that transfer-pricing guidelines have become so much more heavily 
contested is that the circle of stakeholders opining on the guidelines has broadened 
dramatically relative to the recent past.  As late as 2007, it would have been fair to 
describe transfer pricing as a kind of priesthood, where subspecialists debated arcane 
pricing matters using a specialized language that they found meaningful and that others 
left to their purview.  Today, NGOs and finance ministers alike regularly opine on 
transfer-pricing matters.  The public consultations to the BEPS project for transfer-
pricing-related matters alone produced almost five thousand pages of formal comments.  
In this environment, the transfer-pricing technocrats that participate in the OECD’s 
Working Party 6 are much less free to reach conclusions separate and apart from external 
political pressures.  The result is likely to be more reliance on creative ambiguity to reach 
“consensus” outcomes.84  Unfortunately, as Hugh Ault once wrote, “[w]hile creative 
ambiguity can at times be useful, masking important differences with bland platitudes is 
not helpful . . . if country A says the world is flat and country B says the world is round, 
and after a long discussion, the OECD issues a report that says the world is an attractive 
shape and declares a consensus has been reached, it is difficult to call that real progress in 
establishing international norms.”85 
Indeed, the lack of consensus on transfer-pricing norms, leading to agreed-upon language 
that provides plausible support for a wide variety of audit positions that could be taken by 
national tax administrations, is the primary reason that the private sector, NGOs, and the 
OECD itself all have expressed concern about a substantial increase in double taxation 
disputes.86  High public salience on transfer pricing has produced broad agreement that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 See Mindy Herzfeld, Input Needed on Transfer Pricing Drafts, 77 TAX NOTES INT’L 392 (Feb. 2, 2015); 
Comments on Discussion Draft on the Use of Profit Splits in the Context of Global Value Chains and other 
Related Transfer Pricing Issues, China International Tax Center/IFA China Branch (Feb. 6, 2015).  U.S. 
officials, for example, have bemoaned this phenomenon in multiple public appearances.   
84 Mindy Herzfeld’s relentless series of pointed questions posed to the leading OECD Secretariat officials 
in charge of the transfer-pricing workstream within the BEPS project highlighted the level of creative 
ambiguity required to release even some discussion drafts in this area.  Herzfeld, supra note 85.  Multiple 
U.S. Treasury officials, including Bob Stack, Deputy Assistant Secretary (International Tax), Michael 
McDonald, and Brian Jenn have similarly bemoaned the lack of clarity in the transfer pricing discussion 
drafts in multiple public panel appearances.   
85 Ault, supra note 30, at 763. 
86 See, e.g., OECD (2014) Public Discussion Draft BEPS Action 14: Make Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
More Effective 4 (Dec. 18, 2014-Jan. 16, 2015), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/dispute/discussion-
draft-action-14-make-dispute-resolution-mechanisms-more-effective.pdf; Comments Received on Public 	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the old system did not work well, while a lack of shared natural interests among the 
strongest states with respect to the relevant metrics for attributing value creation to a 
jurisdiction forces technocrats to rely on creative ambiguity to mask key tensions, thereby 
opening the door for substantial growth in transfer-pricing controversy.  This outcome is 
consistent with past international financial law projects where high political salience in 
issue areas with distributive consequences resulted in non-resolution of key disputes.87   
B. Where Distributive Problems Are Absent, Soft International 
Economic Law Is Often Effective 
When regulatory questions are politically salient, scholars of international finance 
emphasize that standards evolve in large part as a result of the exercise of power by 
dominant states.88  As a result, standards may be most effective when preferences align 
and distributive problems are largely absent among the major economies or hidden from 
view.89  Notably, in such areas, logics of appropriateness may continue to organize 
discourse among regulators.  Even in these areas, a modicum of enforcement is often 
needed if international coordination is to succeed. 
Some changes to the international tax environment recommended by the BEPS project 
clearly reflect parallel domestic preferences among major economies and the absence of 
well-recognized distributive questions among those parties.  For example, the BEPS 
project includes work to make exchange of information between states compulsory and 
automatic in certain cases when a state provides a taxpayer-specific ruling related to a 
preferential tax regime.90  Most major economies share a preference for information 
about private rulings issued to taxpayers by other states when that ruling has implications 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Discussion Draft, BEPS Actions 8, 9, & 10: Revisions to Chapter I of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
(Including Risk, Recharacterization, and Special Measures) OECD (Feb. 10, 2015) (BIAC Tax Committee, 
BusinessEurope, Deloitte, International Alliance for Principled Taxation, and the International Chamber of 
Commerce, among others, raised concern about an increase in double taxation disputes); Key Points on Tax 
Issues for G20 Sherpas Meeting June 2015 G20 and OECD Must Act to Prevent Failure of the BEPS 
Project, Global Alliance for Tax Justice (June 12, 2015), 
https//bepsmonitoringgroup.files.wordpress.com/2015/06/key-points-on-the-tax-issues-for-g20-sherpas-
meeting-june-2015.pdf; Comments Received on Public Discussion Draft, BEPS Action 14: Make Dispute 
Resolution Mechanisms More Effective, OECD (Jan. 19, 2015) (similar concerns about increased disputes 
raised by EY and SAB Miller).   
87 See n 172, infra, for a discussion of the special place transfer pricing has in the Treaty-based / non-
Treaty-based divide.   
88 See generally DREZNER, supra note 17; Helleiner & Pagliari, supra note 52; Ethan B. Kapstein, 
Resolving the Regulator’s Dilemma:  International Coordination of Banking 
Regulations, 43 INT’L ORG. 323 (1989); STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 
127-151 (1999). 
89 For example, regulatory agreements intended to force public disclosure of information create non-
excludable benefits that are also largely non-rival among G-20 countries, thereby approaching a global 
public good, which facilitates agreement.   
90  OECD/G-20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Countering Harmful Tax Practices More 
Effectively, Taking into Account Transparency and Substance, OECD PUBLISHING 35 (2014) [hereinafter 
Countering Harmful Tax]. 
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for the treatment of a taxpayer in their country.91  Accordingly, at the OECD they have 
designed a framework that specifies when an obligation for informing other countries 
about such rulings arises.92   
Similarly, the BEPS project includes disclosure rules in connection with aggressive or 
abusive transactions, arrangements, or structures used by MNCs.93  The goal is to address 
asymmetry of information between taxpayers and tax administrations.94  In order to 
achieve that goal, OECD recommendations encourage governments to put mandatory 
disclosure regimes in place that require taxpayers to disclose the use of certain tax 
planning “schemes,” as well as the promoters of those schemes.  The OECD then 
advances specific enhanced models of information-sharing among tax administrations 
that delineate aggressive tax-planning arrangements, so as to encourage effective cross-
border administrative assistance regarding these arrangements.95  
In stark contrast to almost every other BEPS agenda item, governments, MNCs, and 
NGOs have objected only at the margins to compulsory spontaneous exchange of 
information on tax rulings related to preferential regimes and mandatory disclosure of 
aggressive tax-planning structures.  Governments have unanimously supported such 
information-forcing measures. The Business and Industry Advisory Council’s statement 
that it “supports the development and use of well-targeted mandatory disclosure rules,” 
followed by suggestions for how best-practice recommendations should be structured, is 
representative of the private-sector stakeholder reaction.96  Even the sheer volume of 
comments on OECD recommendations indicates that these two information-sharing items 
are less important to the stakeholder community relative to the remainder of the BEPS 
Action Plan.97   
Compulsory exchange and mandatory disclosure regimes intended to cabin special tax 
deals made between an MNC and a sovereign and aggressive MNC tax planning fall into 
a broader set of initiatives that reflect an intra-governmental consensus that puts 
information exchange at the center of a more cooperative international tax system. 98  The 
advent of the Common Reporting Standard to address the taxation of offshore accounts of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Id. at 36. 
92 Id. at 39-41. 
93 OECD (2015) Public Discussion Draft BEPS Action 12: Mandatory Disclosure Rules, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/aggressive/discussion-draft-action-12-mandatory-disclosure-rules.pdf (“BEPS 
Action 12”). 
94 Id. 
95 Id.  
96 Comments Received on Public Discussion Draft BEPS Action 12: Mandatory Disclosure rules OECD 26 
(May 4, 2015), available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/aggressive/public-comments-beps-action-12-
mandatory-disclosure-rules.pdf.  
97 Compare, e.g., the 873 pages of submissions on the Risk and Recharacterization Draft with 275 pages of 
submissions addressing aggressive tax planning disclosures. 
98 Here I refer to the transparency dimension of Action 5 as well as the international tax planning dimension 
of Action 12.   
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individuals both underscores and has given impetus to this trend.99  Sovereigns are 
sharing administrative tools to enforce their tax laws, in order to reassert more de facto 
control over their tax policies.100  Given the lack of obvious distributional consequences, 
as well as the optionality provided to sovereigns with respect to implementation of the 
mandatory disclosure rules, the logic of appropriateness associated with transparency 
drove agreements in principle on compulsory exchange and mandatory disclosure.  
Will those agreements amount to anything in practice?  The work of the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)101 in coordinating mutual assistance 
for securities law enforcement among regulators in developed countries provides an 
interesting analogy.102  IOSCO has been largely successful in increasing securities 
enforcement cooperation among all IOSCO members. IOSCO’s Multilateral 
Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the 
Exchange of Information (MMoU) offers a common understanding of how signatories 
are expected to cooperate and exchange information for the purpose of regulatory 
enforcement regarding securities markets.103  Notably, the international financial law 
literature accounts for IOSCO’s success by pointing to the large developed economies’ 
parallel domestic preference for effective securities fraud enforcement, and the absence 
of substantial distributive issues among those countries.104  
Nevertheless, IOSCO eventually adopted a mild coercive sanction to ensure compliance 
with the standards built into the MMoU.  In particular, a national securities commission is 
only eligible for ordinary membership in IOSCO (and the voting privileges such 
membership confers) if it is a signatory to the MMoU.  A “monitoring group” within 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 See Itai Grinberg, Does FATCA Teach Broader Lessons about International Tax Multilateralism?, in 
GLOBAL TAX GOVERNANCE (ECPR Press) (forthcoming).   
100  THOMAS RIXEN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TAX GOVERNANCE 5 (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2008). 
101 IOSCO is the primary institution tasked with setting international standards for securities markets.  
About IOSCO, INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, http://www.iosco.org/about/ ?subsection=about_iosco (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2015).  IOSCO’s members are mostly public authorities and collectively regulate more than 
ninety-five percent of the world’s securities markets.  See IOSCO Historical Background, OICU-IOSCO, 
https://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=background (last visited Sept. 28, 2012); Membership 
Categories and Criteria, INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, 
http://iosco.org/about/index/cfmsection=membership (last visited Sept. 28, 2012).  
102 The Global Forum’s work on exchange of information for tax purposes provides another important 
precedent for thinking through these issues. The focus of much of the Global Forum’s work—the exchange 
of financial account information of offshore account holders between the country of residence of a financial 
intermediary and the country of residence of a taxpayer—represents the real substantive overlap between 
international tax and international financial law.  See Itai Grinberg, Does FATCA Teach Broader Lessons 
about International Tax Multilateralism? in GLOBAL TAX GOVERNANCE (ECPR Press) (forthcoming).   
103  Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the 
Exchange of Information (MMoU), INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, http://www.ww.iosco.org/ 
about/?subsection=mmou (last visited Feb. 2, 2015) [hereinafter MMoU].  The MMoU includes various 
substantive representations regarding domestic law and regulations.  For instance, countries must have rules 
regarding the confidentiality of information exchanged among securities regulators and ensure that no 
domestic banking secrecy, blocking laws or regulations will prevent securities regulators from sharing 
various types of information with their counterparts in other jurisdictions. 
104 Verdier, supra note 71, at 146. 
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IOSCO has discretion to consider and recommend a range of possible options to 
“encourage” compliance in the event that a signatory demonstrates an unwillingness to 
meet the MMoU provisions.105  
The lesson is that even where preferences are aligned, some enforcement mechanism is 
often needed to implement agreements reached under the G-20’s international financial 
law architecture.  In the context of compulsory exchange and mandatory disclosure, 
major economies have parallel preferences for information reporting.  In the case of 
compulsory exchange of information on tax rulings, they have agreed to a monitoring 
mechanism that involves annual reviews of country practices to enforce compliance.106 
Given that in this area major power preferences are aligned, there is good reason to 
believe that compliance may occur.  Would smaller jurisdictions that wish to continue 
offering opaque rulings be willing to ignore the rule?  In the case of compulsory 
exchange of information to other tax administrations about a well-specified class of 
private rulings, reputational consequences and the implicit threat of defensive measures 
taken against a defecting jurisdiction may well be sufficient to ensure widespread 
compliance.107   
In contrast, BEPS project outputs provide sovereigns with quite unfettered optionality in 
implementing the proposed mandatory disclosure rules vis-à-vis taxpayers.  There is no 
clear expectation for when rules should be implemented, so even expectations of 
reciprocity—the least coercive form of pressure seen in international financial law–style 
efforts—will not play a role in national implementation decisions.  In these 
circumstances, one would expect that countries would enact such rules only to the extent 
that they view it in their national interest.  Coordinated implementation of any kind or 
substantial improvements in cross-border administrative assistance as a result of these 
recommendations may prove challenging.  
A more difficult and instructive example regarding information exchange comes from the 
agreements reached in the BEPS project to increase the transparency of MNC transfer-
pricing policies.108  The highest-profile part of the new system endorsed by the OECD 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 In 2013, IOSCO implemented a “watch list” of countries that are non-signatories, and began the process 
of considering further coercive measures to affect the behavior of such countries. MMoU, supra note 105.  
The watch list was created to further “assist” current IOSCO members that are non-signatories “in 
overcoming the obstacles they often encounter in securing support from their governments or legislatures 
for implementing the legal and regulatory changes required for compliance with the MMoU.”  Id. 
106  Countering Harmful Tax, supra note 92, at 49.  
107 Cf. Oona Hathaway & Scott Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and International Law, 12 
YALE L.J. 252 (2011) (in some instances, reputational concerns and the promise of reciprocity from large 
states can be sufficient to engender state-level compliance; in other cases “outcasting” mechanisms and 
threats of sanctions are needed to enforce new international norms) 
108 Under the OECD’s newly agreed approach, transfer pricing documentation standards will require MNCs 
to produce a country-by-country report, a master file, and a local file that will be available to the tax 
administration of each country in which they do business. OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
Project, Action 13: 2014 Deliverable Guidance on Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-
Country Reporting, OECD PUBLISHING, at para. 19 (2014), available at http:// www.oecd-	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and the G-20 is the so-called country-by-country report (CBCR), which is intended to 
give tax administrations a picture of where MNC profits are reported and where real 
activity takes place.109  
The OECD considers the country-by-country report to be part and parcel of its effort to 
improve transfer-pricing rules.  OECD reports reason that in an environment in which 
transfer pricing is increasingly contentious, widely adopted documentation rules can 
reduce compliance costs for business while also providing tax administrations with more 
focused and useful information for transfer-pricing risk assessments and audits. 110  
However, the country-by-country template takes an approach that comports more closely 
with so-called formulary apportionment conceptions of transfer-pricing determination 
than with the arm’s length standard as historically understood.111  The characterization of 
CBCR as being “just about transparency” only somewhat obscures the fact that countries 
could use CBCR data as an impetus to depart from the existing arm’s length standard for 
substantive transfer-pricing enforcement.   
Nevertheless, in stark contrast to other dimensions of the BEPS project associated with 
transfer pricing, the country-by-country reporting rules and other changes to information 
reporting were agreed to with relatively little controversy between governments.112  
Given how deeply objectionable CBCR reporting has been for the private sector, and the 
high levels of disagreement in revising substantive transfer pricing guidance among 
governments, the ease with which CBCR was agreed upon between governments is quite 
striking.  
The key lesson, consistent with the scholarship on international financial law,113 is that in 
G-20-convened processes transparency and information reporting will often be agreed to 
even when little else in an area is possible.114  The simple reason is that information 
reporting is not facially distributional.  Like other reporting regimes, revised reporting 
templates for transfer pricing affect tax administration, but do not, at least as a first-order 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ilibrary.org/taxation/guidance-on-transfer-pricing-documentation-and-country-by-country-
reporting_9789264219236-en oecd/g20 2014 deliverable action 13/2314301e.pdf. 
109 Id. at Exec. Summary.   
110 Id. at para. 4.  
111 See Michael Sala, Country-by-Country Reporting: Potential Audit and Legislative Risks for MNEs, 73 
Tax Notes Int’l 1127, 1128-29 (Mar. 24, 2014); Ajay Gupta, Country-by-Country Reporting Inevitable, 
Global Leaders Say, 76 Tax Notes Int’l 866, 867 (Dec. 8, 2014); BEPS Action Plan: Action 13—Transfer 
Pricing Documentation, Updates, PWC (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/tax/tax-policy-
administration/beps/transfer-pricing-documentation.jhtml (last accessed June 11, 2015). 
112 The resistance to the country-by-country reporting template that emerged in the private sector has 
received support from some members of the U.S. Congress. Nevertheless, for purposes of this discussion, 
the key point is that the U.S. administration, along with other governments, agreed to this reporting concept 
with relatively little resistance, and merely tried to shape the reporting template into something that 
companies could comply with at a reasonable cost.  
113 See generally Verdier, supra note 17.  
114  Cf. Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, International Relations, and 
Compliance, THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Walter Carlnaes, Thomas Risse & Beth 
Simmons, eds., 2002).  
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matter, change substantive transfer-pricing standards or otherwise impact the 
international tax law of jurisdictions around the world.  It can be defended as merely 
encouraging MNCs to avoid booking excessive income in locations that tax 
administrators in major economies would characterize as “tax havens.”  As a result, 
CBCR can be plausibly characterized as merely strengthening national enforcement 
efforts in a non-rivalrous manner among major economies, such that the domestic 
preferences of tax administrations should be aligned.   
CBCR, like mandatory disclosure rules under Action 12, lacks even a mild coercive 
measure agreed to at the international level in order to ensure compliance.  Accordingly, 
it is possible that some countries would defect from implementation of CBCR in the post-
BEPS environment.115  However, the pressures that can be brought to bear by other 
sovereigns are important to understand, as are the reputational dynamics at play.  The 
basic reality is that any sovereign could require the local subsidiary of an MNC to report 
CBCR information on the activities of an entire multinational group.  Furthermore, after 
the BEPS project such a sovereign could point to international norms endorsing CBCR 
and providing a precise template for how the information should be reported both to 
justify its reporting requirements and to suggest that the MNC already will have 
developed systems to collect the relevant data, since it will need to report CBCR 
information to one country or another. Thus, noncompliance by any individual sovereign 
(even a powerful sovereign like the United States) may not be effective.116   
CBCR therefore offers an example where market pressure may allow a subset of states—
even a subset of states that are not usually thought of as having hegemonic power—to 
impose the implementation of a standard without affirmatively coercing other states. 
Given that fact, as in international financial law, reputational pressures associated with 
resisting calls for transparency are likely to push jurisdictions toward conformity with 
CBCR.117 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Certain practitioners and journalists in the United States can be understood to be calling on the United 
States to make a decision to this effect.  See e.g., Mindy Herzfeld, Questions Remain about CbC Reporting, 
78 TAX NOTES INT’L 969 (June 15, 2015).   
116 Indeed, the European Commission seems to recognize this dynamic:  it has been proposing that all 
multinationals operating in Europe be required to provide global CBCR data to European authorities 
regardless of where the multinational is headquartered or whether such requirements are imposed in their 
home jurisdiction.  See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 
on Tax Transparency to Fight Tax Evasion and Avoidance, at 5, COM (2015) 136 (Mar. 18, 2015).  Note 
that the European Commission proposal would go one step further than CBCR as proposed by the OECD.  
It would make CBCR data public, rather than treating it as confidential taxpayer information available only 
to tax administrations.  Given how abhorrent that result would be to the United States, with its deeply 
entrenched commitment to taxpayer confidentiality, including corporate taxpayer confidentiality, one might 
interpret the European Commission proposal as a kind of veiled threat against the United States.  Without 
making any normative judgment, the point I make here is merely that under the circumstances this is a 
pretty effective threat.  
117 See supra note 113; c.f. BRUMMER, supra note 17.  The agreement on a modified nexus approach for IP 
regimes reached within the course of the BEPS project also creates pressures that may, at least in the short 
term, lead to convergence around a common “patent box” structure. The patent box issue is significantly 
more complicated than CBCR, in part because of the prospect that countries may engage in mock 	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In contrast, consider a substantive tax subject area like interest expense allocation.118  As 
Michael Graetz has observed, there appear to be quite limited reasons for any country to 
want to provide deductions that encourage local borrowing to finance foreign 
investment.119  The base erosion accepted by the jurisdiction providing the deduction 
does not come with any obvious offsetting benefits—benefits of the kind that local, direct 
investment or research and development spending might bring, for example.120  Given the 
linkages between source country and residence country limitations on interest expense 
deductions, addressing the problem multilaterally through some allocation mechanism is 
also normatively attractive from the perspective of a logic of appropriateness grounded in 
a single tax principle.121  An initial understanding that there were similar domestic 
preferences and limited distributional concerns among the major economies therefore 
drove government officials to agreement in principle on the need for action in the area of 
interest expense allocation at the outset of the BEPS project.122   
Concrete concerns of specific jurisdictions and specific industries, however, are likely to 
undermine implementation.  If a group of high-rate countries adopted a group-wide 
interest-expense allocation rule, it could incentivize multinationals to locate borrowing in 
other jurisdictions to a sufficient extent that those other jurisdictions might feel pressured 
to adopt similar limitations on interest deductibility to staunch revenue losses.  However, 
that form of market pressure toward consistent implementation likely requires collective 
movement by a significant subset of jurisdictions.123  Increasing limitations on interest 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
compliance with the limitations on IP regimes put forward under the modified nexus agreement, and in part 
because contrasting patent boxes with interest expense allocation would raise questions around the issue of 
competitiveness.  Space constraints prevent a more fulsome discussion of the issue here. 
118 Injecting related-party debt into a high-taxed subsidiary within a related-party structure, thereby 
overleveraging high-tax subsidiaries relative to low-tax subsidiaries, may be the single simplest tax 
planning strategy available to multinational enterprises.  C.f. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, GENERAL 
EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2015 PROPOSALS 49 (Mar. 2014) [hereinafter FY 
2015 GREENBOOK], available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-
Explanations-FY2015.pdf, http://perma.cc/UW4R-AFNN. 
119 Michael J. Graetz, A Multilateral Solution for the Income Tax Treatment of Interest Expenses, BULL. 
INT’L TAXATION 486, 490–91 (Nov. 2008); Reuven Avi-Yonah, Who Invented the Single Tax Principle? An 
Essay on the History of U.S. Treaty Policy, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 309 (2015).   
120 Moreover, when borrowing in a high-tax country and financing investments in a low-tax country, the 
result is after-tax returns greater than the investment’s pre-tax returns—which by definition decreases 
worldwide economic welfare through distorted capital allocations.   
121 Graetz, supra note 121, at 490-91. The conceptual appeal of a multilateral solution is enhanced by the 
fact that sourcing inconsistencies or other rule asymmetries can result in disallowance of interest 
deductions by a residence country jurisdiction that a source country may also disallow, creating double 
and/or excessive taxation of a productive investment. As a result, the two issues of residence countries’ 
limitations on interest deductions for borrowing to finance low-taxed, exempt, or deferred foreign-source 
income and of source countries’ restrictions on interest deductions intended to limit companies’ ability to 
strip income from a higher-tax country into a lower-tax one are linked.  Id. 
122 OECD (2014) Public Discussion Draft BEPS Action 4: Interest Deductions and Other Financial 
Payments, available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/aggressive/discussion-draft-action-4-interest-
deductions.pdf.  
123  But see Martin A. Sullivan, A Proposal for the Tax Treatment of Interest in a Territorial System, 40 
PEPP. L. REV. 1345, 1361 (2013) (arguing that unilateral adoption by the U.S. of interest allocation rules 	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expense singlehandedly would likely increase the effective tax rate for affected 
businesses, but, in contrast to a change in the tax rate, could do so to an extent that is hard 
to predict ex ante and may not be consistent across industries.  Meaningful unilateral 
action by one jurisdiction might also asymmetrically increase effective capital costs, 
leading to concerns regarding the competitiveness of domestic firms.   As a result, 
pressures to renege are more likely to arise from tangible fact patterns than is the case in 
the information-reporting context. Without meaningful enforcement mechanisms, these 
distributional concerns are likely to undermine the effectiveness of any agreement as to 
standards, or may motivate conversion of any such agreement into a more lenient 
regime.124   
C. Overcoming Identified Distributive Pressures Is Challenging  
Soft international economic law can be effective even when the preferences of major 
economies diverge.  However, in these circumstances, national regulators tend to take 
positions that reflect the interests of domestic constituencies.125  As a result, “the 
adoption of common standards requires solving distributive problems where the interests 
of these constituencies diverge.”126  Significant coercion will usually be required to 
achieve either agreement or effective implementation.127  In most cases, therefore, 
distributive problems are likely to remain unresolved, either at the level of principle or at 
the level of implementation.   
The OECD’s work regarding the design of controlled foreign company (CFC) rules 
provides a case study for the underlying principle that soft international economic law 
efforts are unlikely to work when distributive problems exist among the major 
economies.  CFC rules tax a defined subset of income of a foreign subsidiary in the 
country of residence of the parent.  CFC rules have a close connection to the broader 
question of whether a jurisdiction should generally tax all foreign-source income earned 
by foreign subsidiaries of a corporation resident in its jurisdiction, because CFC rules 
impose such a regime for a defined subset of income.128  U.S. CFC rules go beyond those 
of many other countries by reaching various categories of income deemed “highly 
mobile” under U.S. law.129  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
would incentivize MNCs to shift borrowing outside the U.S. and that multilateral adoption would level the 
playing field). 
124 C.f. Verdier, supra note 71.   
125 Id. at 142; Singer, supra note 18, at 535. 
126 Verdier, supra note 71.   
127 See, e.g., Singer, supra note 18, at 535. 
128 Most large economies have CFC rules that at minimum tax unrelated party passive income earned by 
foreign subsidiaries currently in the country of residence of the parent corporation.  From there, CFC rules 
vary widely. Guide to Controlled Foreign Company Regimes, Deloitte (Aug. 1, 2015), 
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-guide-to-cfc-regimes-
210214.pdf (comparing CFC regimes).   
129 Similarly, U.S. law departs from international norms by taxing U.S. multinational companies on all 
profits earned by their foreign subsidiaries when these profits are repatriated as dividends.  Among the 
large developed economies, the United States is now alone in imposing this system of taxation on tax-	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The United States went into the BEPS project strongly advocating the need to address 
BEPS multilaterally through tighter CFC rules.130  If implemented broadly, such changes 
would move all jurisdictions closer to imposing worldwide systems for the taxation of 
foreign-source income earned by tax-resident multinationals.  The Obama administration 
may have believed that it could use the BEPS project to pressure legislators at home and 
abroad in the direction of the administration’s worldwide minimum tax CFC rule ideal.  
Indeed, the United States’ initial rationale for supporting the BEPS project may have 
rested on the hope that it would create international pressure for tighter CFC rules.131   
Analysis through the international financial law lens would have suggested that this 
gambit of the Obama administration was doomed to fail.  Tighter CFC rules are viewed 
as undesirable by a number of G-20 governments because of their distributive 
consequences.132  On the one hand, tighter CFC rules primarily increase tax revenues for 
countries that are the parent jurisdiction for substantial numbers of multinationals.  On 
the other hand, when a country’s CFC rules extend beyond the scope of those imposed by 
other jurisdictions, they may impact corporate residence and investment location 
decisions made by multinationals.  Financial markets are paying increased attention to the 
tax consequences of corporate residence.133  Moreover, corporate residence is at least 
partially elective, so that CFC rules adopted by any state can be circumvented over 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
resident multinational corporations. The move away from so-called “worldwide” (deferral) tax systems to 
“dividend exemption” systems in the developed economies has been driven both by competitive dynamics 
and scholarship suggesting that exemption systems are economically preferable to worldwide regimes. See, 
e.g. Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Evaluating International Tax Reform, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 487, 496 
(2003); Eric Drabkin, Kenneth Serwin, & Laura D’Andrea Tyson, Implications of a Switch to a Territorial 
Tax System in the United States: A Critical Comparison to the Current System, Working Paper, BERKELEY 
RESEARCH GROUP (2013). 
130  Moreover, both immediately prior to the launch of the BEPS project and shortly thereafter, the Obama 
administration made proposals domestically to substantially tighten the CFC rules applicable to U.S.-
incorporated MNCs. The major Administration proposal at the time the BEPS project was launched was to 
tax currently to the parent corporation (as subpart F income) all “excess returns” of controlled foreign 
subsidiaries of U.S. MNCs. U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S 
FISCAL YEAR 2011 REVENUE PROPOSALS 43 (2010), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/documents/general-explanations-fy2011.pdf.  Depending on the details, if enacted this 
rule could have moved the U.S. international tax system quite close to a true worldwide tax system.  For 
fiscal year 2015, the Administration abandoned its excess returns proposal in favor of its current “minimum 
tax” proposals, which also involve strengthening CFC rules.  FY 2015 GREENBOOK, supra note 120, at 58, 
60.   
131  See generally, U.S. Tax Reform Efforts Must Be Informed by International Fight Against Base Erosion, 
DAILY TAX REP. (Dec. 11, 2012) (quoting then Deputy Assistant Secretary International Tax Affairs Manal 
Corwin), 
http://news.bna.com/dtln/DTLNWB/doc_display.adp?fedfid=28868017&vname=dtrnot&jd=a0d5q4q4y5&
split=0; Manal Corwin, Sense and Sensibility: The Policy and Politics of BEPS, reprinted in TAX NOTES, 
Oct. 6, 2014 at 139–40. 
132 C.f. Dhammika Dharmapala, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting: A Simple Conceptual Framework 10 (U. 
of Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. For L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 703), available at 
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2377&context=law_and_economics. 
133 See generally Ajay Gupta, Investment Banks Playing Inversions from Both Sides, 75 TAX NOTES INT'L 
895 (Sept. 15, 2014); Ajay Gupta, Market Bets Against Retroactive Anti-Inversion Legislation, 75 TAX 
NOTES INT'L 1122 (Sept. 29, 2014); Amanda Athanasiou, U.S. Drug Companies Seeing Green in Irish 
Inversions, 75 TAX NOTES INT'L 351 (Aug. 4, 2014). 
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time.134  As a result, the tax rules affecting outbound investment by an MNC create 
important and potentially distortive consequences for ownership structures, in addition to 
affecting the allocation of capital and national well-being.135  Defection from any 
agreement on tighter CFC rules may produce substantial benefits in terms of the location 
of headquarters activities and highly skilled employment opportunities for the defecting 
jurisdiction.136  As a result, other jurisdictions with sufficient market weight were not 
prepared to lend substantive support to the Obama administration’s proposals.137  Indeed, 
for many years, CFC rules have mainly been relaxed rather than strengthened around the 
world.138   
Given the potential distributive consequences associated with CFC rules, the history of 
international financial law teaches that any effort to encourage implementation of tighter 
CFC rules by sovereigns would only be likely to succeed if non-implementation were to 
carry substantial unfavorable consequences.  For example, the Basel I Accord on capital 
adequacy for financial institutions was in an important sense redistributive.  During the 
Latin American debt crisis of the 1980’s, the US and UK felt compelled to bail out 
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico in order to indirectly rescue their own banks, which had 
loaned heavily to these countries, from the potential consequences of sovereign debt 
defaults.139 Regulators in both countries then came under pressure to raise capital 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 See Daniel Shaviro, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: The Rising Tax Electivity of U.S. Corporate 
Residency 377, 402 OXFORD UNIV. CTR. BUS. TAX (2011); see also DANIEL SHAVIRO, FIXING U.S. 
INTERNATIONAL TAX TAXATION (2014).   
135 See, e.g., Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Do Strong Fences Make Strong Neighbors?, 63 
NAT’L TAX J. 723 (2010); Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Evaluating International Tax Reform, 56 
NAT’L TAX J. 487 (2003); Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Expectations and Expatriations: Tracing 
the Causes and Consequences of Corporate Inversions, 55 NAT’L TAX J. 409 (2002).  
136 C.f. HM TREASURY, CORPORATE TAX REFORM: DELIVERING A MORE COMPETITIVE SYSTEM 14 (2010) 
(“Reform of the UK’s Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) rules is frequently identified by UK 
multinational businesses as the key priority needed to improve the UK’s tax competitiveness.”). 
137 In the international financial law area, IOSCO’s efforts to adopt uniform capital rules for securities firms 
reached a parallel demise twenty years earlier.  These rules were effectively defeated by divergent domestic 
preferences in the U.S. and the U.K.  After the 1987 market crash, the United Kingdom faced domestic 
pressures to raise capital adequacy standards for securities firms.  Moreover, the U.K. made a strong case 
that doing so internationally in a coordinated fashion would reduce systemic risk.  However, U.S. 
regulators did not face the same pressures and saw competitive threats to U.S. securities firms from 
movement towards consolidated supervision.  Given U.S. market power, U.S. resistance alone was enough 
to defeat agreement at IOSCO.  Verdier, supra note 17, at 1450. 
138 See e.g., Thorton Matheson, Victoria Perry & Chandara Veung, Territorial vs. Worldwide Taxation: 
Implications for Developing Countries (Int’l Monetary Fund Working Paper, October 2013), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13205.pdf; Mike Williams, Dir., Bus. & Int’l Tax., HM 
Treas., remarks at Corporate Inversions and Tax Policy, The Brookings Institution (Jan. 23, 2015), 
available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2015/01/23%20corporate%20inversions/20150123_corporate_ta
x_inversions_transcript.pdf.  For instance, the UK government, among others, has changed its corporate tax 
regime over time to focus more on profits from UK activity in determining the tax base rather than 
attributing the worldwide income of a group to the UK in order to make the UK an attractive headquarters 
jurisdiction for international investment.  
139  See, e.g., WOLFGANG H. REINICKE, BANKING, POLITICS AND GLOBAL FINANCE: AMERICAN 
COMMERCIAL BANKS AND REGULATORY CHANGE, 1980–1990, 142 (1995).	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adequacy standards for domestic banks in order to limit the opportunity for banking 
concerns to socialize the cost of bad loans again at a future date.140  The Basel Accord 
effectively shifted part of the potential cost of these increased capital adequacy 
requirements (reduced competitiveness of U.S. and UK banking concerns internationally) 
onto the Japanese, French, German, and Swiss banks that were the primary competitors 
of U.S. and UK financial institutions at that time.  The adoption of the Basel I Accord 
over the resistance of other countries was thus a function of relative power.141  At the 
time, the dominance of U.S. and UK financial markets was such that by threatening to 
exclude noncompliant foreign banks from their markets, those two powers alone were 
able to overcome countervailing interests.142 
However, the United States was largely alone from the beginning in pushing for tighter 
CFC rules. Nor did it propose a coercive device that would change the calculus for other 
states.  Moreover, given constraints imposed by the Treaties on the Functioning of the 
European Union, as interpreted by the European Court of Justice, even if some European 
members of the G-20 had an interest in tightening CFC rules, they could not agree to any 
unfavorable consequences for non-implementation of CFC recommendations.143  Perhaps 
for that reason, a little more than a year into the BEPS project, the International Tax 
Counsel of the United States publicly suggested that moral suasion rather than coercion 
was the most likely mechanism by which compliance with CFC recommendations might 
be obtained.144  That suggestion effectively constituted an acknowledgment that the effort 
to establish meaningful OECD standards for tightened CFC rules was over, only halfway 
through the project.145   In the end, the discussion draft issued by the OECD on 
international standards for CFC rules provides a series of caveated statements 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 SINGER, supra note 17, at 9.  	  
141  Verdier, supra note 71, at 136.  
142 Id.  
143 In the landmark case Cadbury Schweppes v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue, the European Court of 
Justice effectively held that CFC rules that operate automatically and do not permit a corporate taxpayer to 
exercise his freedom of movement within the European Union infringe on a fundamental economic 
freedom guaranteed by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.  Case C-196/04, Cadbury 
Schweppes, P.L.C. v. Comm’rs of Inland Revenue, 2006 E.C.R. 1-7995; RUTH MASON, PRIMER ON DIRECT 
TAXATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 309–13 (2d ed.).  As a result, CFC rules for European multinationals, 
at least for their operations within Europe, are illegal under European law unless they are targeted at what 
the ECJ terms “wholly artificial arrangements.”  Lillian Faulhaber, Sovereignty, Integration, and Tax 
Avoidance in the European Union: Striking the Proper Balance, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 177 (2010). 
The tighter CFC rules envisioned by the Obama administration in the United States likely would not pass 
ECJ scrutiny if imposed in a European jurisdiction with respect to activity by CFCs in other member states 
(or EFTA states). In this context, arguments from the United States and the OECD that CFC rules have 
positive spillover effects in source countries because taxpayers have less of an incentive to shift profits into 
low-tax jurisdictions were bound to be unavailing. 
144 Danielle Rolfes, Int’l Tax Counsel. U.S. Treas. Dep’t, Remarks at Georgetown University Law Center 
Panel:  BEPS, CFC Rules, Patent Boxes, and EU Law (Oct. 2, 2014) (notes of author, who moderated the 
event).   
145  Id.; see also, e.g., DBriefs Bytes Transcript, DBRIEFS (Oct. 10, 2014), 
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/About-
Deloitte/Dbriefs_bepscentral/dbriefs_script_10oct2014_a3.pdf.  See also Kristen A. Parillo, BEPS Interest 
Report Will Recommend Fixed Ratio, 148 TAX NOTES 547 (Aug. 3, 2015).   
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acknowledging that the policy objectives of CFC rules will vary between jurisdictions, 
while attempting to defend the proposition that CFC rules continue to play some role in 
domestic rules addressing cross-border taxation.146 
D. Path Dependence Matters When National Action is Sufficient 
Path dependence can also affect outcomes, particularly when substantial implementation 
of agreed-upon rules is possible through national action alone.  In these cases, agreements 
supported by a strong logic of appropriateness may be effective even once major 
countries focus on non-aligned distributive outcomes.  
Consider the OECD work intended to “neutralize the effect of hybrid mismatch 
arrangements” (Action 2 of the BEPS Action Plan).  These arrangements involve the use 
of hybrid instruments or hybrid entities to produce a taxpayer-favorable inconsistency in 
the tax treatment of a transaction across two jurisdictions.147  One example involves an 
entity that is treated as making a deductible payment to a related party under the laws of 
the payor jurisdiction but is disregarded as separate from its owner under the laws of the 
payee jurisdiction, such that the payment is not included in income in the payee 
jurisdiction. 148   Similarly, a financial instrument may be viewed as debt in one 
jurisdiction and as equity in the other.  Depending on the tax laws of the jurisdictions in 
question, payments on the instrument could be characterized as deductible interest in the 
payor jurisdiction and as a non-taxable dividend in the payee jurisdiction.149  The basic 
rationale of appropriateness underlying the hybrid mismatch initiative is to ensure 
matching of income and deductions across international boundaries in much the same 
way that such matching is often achieved within domestic income tax regimes.  This 
“single tax principle” is at the heart of the policy coherence narrative of the BEPS 
project. 
Agreement in principle about the appropriateness of curtailing hybrid planning was 
reached in 2012, before the tax treatment of the cross-border activity of multinational 
enterprises had morphed into a political issue worthy of attention at the G-20.150  The 
initial outcome was largely a product of technocratic regulatory consensus among tax 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Public Discussion Draft, BEPS Action 3: Strengthening CFC Rules 9-14, OECD (May 12, 2015).  
147 OECD/G-20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Action 2: 2014 Deliverable Neutralising the 
Effect of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements OECD PUBLISHING 8 (2014).  The principal hybrid mismatches 
identified by the OECD are payments that are deductible under the rules of the country of the payer and not 
included in the income of the recipient (deduction/no inclusion outcomes) and payments that give rise to 
duplicate deductions as a result of a single expenditure (double deduction outcomes). 
148 Id. at 42.   
149 Similarly, an entity that is viewed as transparent under the laws of one jurisdiction and opaque under the 
laws of another jurisdiction may lead a single payment made by the hybrid entity to be deductible in two 
jurisdictions.  The OECD project’s scope is limited to arrangements where a mismatch in treatment is 
caused by the hybrid element and the mismatch in tax outcomes lowers the aggregate tax paid by the 
parties to the arrangement.  Id. at 10.   
150 ORG. ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEV., HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS: TAX POLICY AND 
COMPLIANCE ISSUES 13–14 (Mar. 2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-
information/HYBRIDS_ENG_Final_October2012.pdf. 
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administration professionals.  The major exception to technocratic focus was the United 
States: President Barack Obama gave a speech that targeted hybrid arrangements of U.S. 
multinationals in 2009.151  As a first-order matter, these arrangements reduced foreign tax 
rather than U.S. tax paid by U.S. MNCs,152 so a focus on limiting U.S. companies’ use of 
hybrid arrangements was arguably at odds with national interest.  Indeed, eventually the 
Obama administration withdrew its 2009 domestic budget proposal to curtail taxpayers’ 
ability to create hybrid entities via the “check-the-box” rules.153  However, given the 
political direction established by the Obama administration, U.S. technocratic officials 
working at the OECD took positions that were consistent with both the logic of 
appropriateness developed in that multilateral technocratic context and the President’s 
domestic political rhetoric.  They approved guidance in March 2012 recommending that 
foreign sovereigns take action to change their laws to counteract the benefit of hybrid 
mismatches. 154   At this stage, expressed preferences among major markets were aligned, 
and distributive concerns had been put aside.   
When the BEPS process was launched, the March 2012 principles were translated into a 
highly prescriptive BEPS output.155  Eventually, practitioners made clear that in practice, 
implementation could disproportionately impact U.S.-based multinationals. U.S. officials 
began to think in terms of logics of consequences:  their particular concern was that the 
BEPS recommendations in this area would prioritize source-country taxation and not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on International Tax Policy Reform (May 4, 2009), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-The-President-On-International-
Tax-Policy-Reform.  
152 International Tax Issues Relating to Globalization: Hearing Before Comm. of Finance, 106th Cong. 107 
(1999) (written statement of Multinational Tax Coalition), available at 
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000043053551;view=1up;seq=111. But see Edward Kleinbard, 
Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 755-56 (2011); see also Edward Kleinbard, The Lessons of 
Stateless Income, 65 TAX LAW REV. 99 (2011).  
153 Compare U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 
2010 REVENUE PROPOSALS 28 (May 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2010.pdf with U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., GENERAL 
EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2011 REVENUE PROPOSALS (Feb. 2010), available 
at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2011.pdf.  That 
decision was consistent with a respected Treasury economist’s well-read finding that the benefits of 
eliminating check-the-box would inure as a revenue matter largely to foreign sovereigns. Harry Grubert & 
Rosanne Altshuler, Fixing the System: An Analysis of Alternative Proposals for the Reform of International 
Tax, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 671, 673, 696 (2013) (arguing that “repeal of check-the-box would result in 
companies unwinding hybrids and sheltering income in countries with rates below the U.S. rate.”).  See 
also U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2015 
REVENUE PROPOSALS 61 (Mar. 2014), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2015.pdf (targeting hybrid mismatches only in circumstances 
where U.S. deductions could be denied and therefore U.S. revenue increased).   
154 ORG. ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEV., HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS: TAX POLICY AND 
COMPLIANCE ISSUES (March 2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-
information/HYBRIDS_ENG_Final_October2012.pdf. 
155 OECD/G-20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Action 2: 2014 Deliverable Neutralising the 
Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, OECD PUBLISHING, available at http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/download/2314261e.pdf?expires=1440364950&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=
8EE41D97CF974D2705FFD817152DF068.  	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require countries to defer to residence-country taxation under CFC rules.  Consequently, 
the adoption of these recommendations to curtail hybrid planning would result in U.S. 
MNCs paying more in taxes to foreign sovereigns rather than to the United States.156  At 
this point, however, it was too late for U.S. officials to change course.  Prior acceptance 
of the logic of appropriateness associated with addressing hybrid mismatches (to ensure 
single taxation) constrained the scope for diplomatic action by U.S. technocrats. 
Thereafter, countries began adopting legislation intended to implement the outcome of 
the OECD’s work on hybrids, even before the BEPS project officially drew to a close.157  
The outcome demonstrates both how the logic of appropriateness matters and how path 
dependence affects the outcomes in international financial law–style processes when 
implementation is a matter of national action rather than international agreement.  
E. Mock Compliance Is One Likely Response 
Compliance with international standards by nation-states (and private actors) can be 
superficial rather than substantive.  Faced with international financial law–style 
standards, some nation-states may gravitate toward mock compliance.158 At the most 
obvious level, mock compliance involves combining formalistic implementation with 
alternative relief for regulated actors.  Mock compliance can also be achieved through 
systematic regulatory forbearance; informal, administrative non-enforcement; and private 
compliance failures that go undetected.159   
For instance, after the Asian crisis of 1997–1998, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, and 
Thailand came under intense external pressure to transform their financial regulatory 
regimes to comply with new international standards.160  However, substantive third-party 
monitoring of their responses to the new international standards was difficult to achieve.  
As a result, each of these countries was largely able to defuse external pressure by 
engaging in cosmetic legal and regulatory changes that did not fundamentally alter the 
regime under which domestic enterprises and financial institutions functioned.161 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 Indeed, as Grubert and Altshuler observe, even if priority were given to residence country taxation of 
hybrid payments, in the case of the United States, given that U.S. rates are higher than the rates in almost 
all other jurisdictions, one would expect tax planners to unwind hybrid structures, with the result that 
increased tax revenues would still accrue to jurisdictions other than the U.S.  See Grubert & Altshuler, 
supra note 155.  See also Robert G. Rinninsland & Kenneth Lobo, U.S.-Based Pushback on BEPS, 1 
INSIGHTS 10, 14 (2014), available at http://publications.ruchelaw.com/new/2014-
08/Insights_Vol_1_No_07_Master.pdf.   
157 The Latest on BEPS—2014 in Review, A Review of OECD and Country Actions in 2014, 3, EY (Mar. 16, 
2015), http://emergingmarkets.ey.com/the-latest-on-beps-2014-in-review/ (last accessed May 14, 2015). 
158 WALTER, supra note 17.  
159  Id. at 31–33.   
160 Those countries were not party to the standard-setting bodies that were tasked with crafting these 
standards, and had no influence on their content.   
161 See WALTER, supra note 17.  Somewhat similarly, although agreement at the level of principle was 
reached at the FSB on central clearing mechanisms for OTC derivatives with regulation imposed by the 
country of residence, unilateral actions since the time of that agreement have encouraged local clearing 
mechanisms and greater host country regulation.  See Helleiner, supra note 72, at 16. 
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Similarly, dynamic responses to the BEPS project that could be characterized as mock 
compliance are already starting to emerge.  For instance, the Swiss Federal Council (the 
Swiss executive branch of government) has proposed a “Federal Law on Measures to 
Maintain the Competitiveness of Business Location Switzerland.” 162   The explicit 
purpose of this legislation is to repeal Swiss law facilitating tax planning of the type 
targeted by BEPS before the BEPS project is complete, and to simultaneously open other 
avenues for companies to minimize their tax burden if they locate principal company and 
financing activity in Switzerland.  Key features of the proposed legislation included a 
Swiss patent box at the cantonal level and a “notional interest” deduction on so-called 
surplus equity of Swiss companies applicable at both the federal and cantonal levels.163   
Ireland is similarly beginning tax reform that is intended to maximize competitive 
advantage within the broad constraints imposed by BEPS outcomes.164  Belgium already 
has a notional interest deduction that can be used to circumvent the limitations that would 
come into being even if every country followed the recommendations of the OECD in the 
area of interest deductibility.  These are just a few examples.  Even if the OECD were to 
take steps to change international standards again to try to counter the impact of legal 
adaptations in Ireland, Switzerland and elsewhere, there will usually be further legislative 
strategies available for small open economies interested in maintaining their 
competitiveness for foreign direct investment.  Some level of regulatory forbearance in 
jurisdictions interested in attracting revenue, employment, or both should also be 
expected, and constitutes another avenue for mock compliance.   
F. Final Observations 
The lessons described above paint a realist picture.  Yet in the context of international 
financial law, even realist analysts point out that purely consequentialist thinking faces 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 See Switzerland Publishes Corporate Tax Reform III, TAX INSIGHTS FROM INT’L TAX SERVS. PWC 
(Sept. 26, 2014), available at http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/tax-services/publications/insights/assets/pwc-
switzerland-publishes-corporate-tax-reform-iii-consultation.pdf; see also Swiss Federal Council Publishes 
Revised Bill Together with Dispatch (associated commentary) on Corporate Tax Reform III, EY GLOBAL 
TAX ALERT (June 8, 2015), available at 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Swiss_Federal_Council_publishes_revised_bill_together_wit
h_dispatch_(associated_commentary)_on_Corporate_Tax_Reform_III/$FILE/2015G_CM5505_Swiss%20
FC%20publishes%20revised%20bill%20together%20with%20dispatch%20on%20Corp%20Tax%20Refor
m%20III.pdf (explaining 2015 revisions to the Federal Council proposal and noting that the notional 
interest deduction was removed but may be reintroduced as part of parliamentary debate).  
163  See Switzerland Publishes Corporate Tax Reform III, TAX INSIGHTS FROM INT’L TAX SERVS. 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP), Sept. 26, 2014, available at http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/tax-
services/publications/insights/assets/pwc-switzerland-publishes-corporate-tax-reform-iii-consultation.pdf. 
164 Ireland issued a “Road Map for Ireland’s Tax Competitiveness” as part of its 2015 budget.  The proposal 
includes a new “Knowledge Development Box,” increased tax amortization for IP assets, R&D tax credit 
enhancements, a “secondee assignment relief program” that incentivizes non-Irish executives to move to 
Ireland by offering them reduced income tax rates at the individual level, and other steps intended to 
maximize the probability that in a post-BEPS environment multinationals will relocate both income and 
high-paying jobs out of high-tax jurisdictions and put them in Ireland.  Competing in a Changing World, A 
Roadmap for Ireland’s Tax Competitiveness, GOV’T OF IR., DEP’T OF FINANCE (Oct. 2014), available at 
budget.gov.ie/Budgets/2015/Documents/Competing_Changing_World_Tax_Road_Map_final.pdf.   
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certain constraints.165  Regulators may find it difficult to make an accurate ex ante 
assessment of the costs and benefits of agreeing to a proposed new international standard, 
or complying with that standard.  It may not be clear to the regulator which domestic 
groups’ interests to take into account, or which economic or political theory to use to 
determine how to weigh those interests.  Finally, it is unclear how far-sighted regulators 
can be in calculating costs and benefits.  To the extent regulators must comply with 
politicians’ wishes or are heavily influenced by the political environment, they may 
weigh the short- or medium-term quite heavily.  All these factors make outcomes difficult 
to predict, and more than just a consequence of the interplay of national interests and 
legal and procedural constraints.  
Moreover, given all the uncertainty a regulator faces, debates about international 
standards can act as a kind of focal point. Indeed, law firms and accounting firms around 
the world now routinely catalogue the various national proposals that are vaguely related 
to outcomes of the BEPS project, even as they depart from the details thereof.166  For 
example, numerous countries have put forth proposals to tighten interest expense 
limitations, even though none seem to be following the emerging BEPS 
recommendations in this regard. When a multilateral project is sufficiently politically 
salient, even an inconclusive part of the project may matter, because it can act as a locus 
for subsequent domestic policy debates.   
III. Breaking BEPS in Two: The Special Status of the OECD Model Treaty 
Many of the limitations on coordinating international tax governance described in Part II 
result from the multi-step nature of building successful regimes using the international 
financial law model.  Agreements reached internationally must be implemented 
domestically through legislative or regulatory action.  States may have incentives to agree 
in principle at the international level and then fail to implement domestically.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 WALTER, supra note 17. 
166 See e.g., The Latest on BEPS—2014 in Review, A Review of OECD and Country Actions in 2014, EY, 
Mar. 16, 2015, http://emergingmarkets.ey.com/the-latest-on-beps-2014-in-review/ (last accessed May 14, 
2015); OECD BEPS Action Plan Taking the Pulse in the Asia Pacific Region: Survey of Participation and 
Action among Asia Pacific Countries, KPMG (Sept. 2014), 
http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/services/Tax/addressing-the-changing-tax-
environment/Documents/taking-the-pulse-in-the-asia-pacific-region.pdf; BEPS Country Scorecards, 
available at http://www2.deloitte.com/global/en/pages/tax/articles/beps-country-scorecards.html (website 
provides updates on country activity on BEPS by regions).  Just a few examples can give one a sense of the 
range of government activity.  New laws relating to registration of providers of digital services were 
recently enacted by India, Israel, and Italy in relation to BEPS Action 1 (which addresses tax challenges 
related to the so-called “digital economy”). Italy recently legislated to deny the use of a cost-plus method 
for transfer pricing for entities who sell online advertisement services.  Anti-hybrid rules on both inbound 
and outbound payments in the EU and in Australia are inspired by but not entirely consistent with the letter 
of the recommendations incorporated in the output of Action 2 of the BEPS project.  A variety of countries 
have already modified thin cap rules or introduced interest caps, even though to date none have followed 
the approach suggested in the discussion drafts associated with Action 4 of the Action Plan. All of these 
national actions have been linked to discussions that took place in the BEPS project, but none follow 
OECD recommendations.   
WORKING DRAFT, COMMENTS WELCOME  	  
	   36 
The OECD Model Treaty is a “soft law” instrument, and in that sense agreements to 
change the OECD Model Treaty are similar to agreements reached in international 
financial law–style processes.  However, in contrast to international financial law-type 
agreements, changes to the OECD Model Treaty and its commentaries (the 
“Commentary”) impact the legal and administrative outcomes in international tax 
directly.  Not only are the OECD Model Treaty and Commentary (together, the “OECD 
Model”) highly influential; in some respects changes to the OECD Model are 
automatically incorporated into domestic law and administrative practice in many 
countries around the world.  As a result, agreements on and compliance with changes to 
the OECD Model are subject to many fewer pressures than OECD recommendations that 
take a form similar to international financial law.  
The procedural and institutional dynamics of both the BEPS project and future 
multilateral efforts in international tax should therefore be analyzed by bifurcating 
proposed solutions based on whether or not they are Model Treaty–based.  There are 
fundamentally different institutional dynamics for international tax efforts that rely on the 
bilateral tax treaty architecture as opposed to international financial law–style solutions.   
The treatment of the OECD Model by both national courts and tax administrations make 
the negotiation of treaty-based changes to the OECD Model akin to a single-stage 
negotiating game among states. For Model Treaty–based changes, the political economy 
dynamics described in Part II may apply to negotiation of soft law at the multilateral 
level, but do not apply to implementation of that soft law.167  Marrying the political 
efficacy of G-20–convened soft-law processes with the legal efficacy of changes to the 
OECD Model is powerful.  In this regard, it is also important to recognize that most 
countries either have a “monist” view of law, in which international treaties are superior 
to domestic statutes, or are more averse to treaty overrides than the United States has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 Indeed, in the area of substantive transfer pricing guidance, high political salience has created a political 
economy dynamic analogous to the one seen in recent years in international financial law.  See, n. 76 - 89 
and accompanying text, supra.  Transfer pricing is a special case: it is linked to the treaties, because the 
arm’s length standard is part of Article 9 of the OECD Model.  However, transfer pricing sits between 
Model Treaty–based and non-Treaty-based guidance for purposes of this article.  The reason is two-fold.  
First, the OECD has created extensive Transfer Pricing Guidelines (running over 350 pages and expanding 
to almost 500 after the BEPS project) that interpret the arm’s length standard outside the Commentary.  In 
many jurisdictions, the physical separation of the guidelines from the Commentary has led courts and tax 
administrations to think of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines as a distinct soft law instrument with a 
different persuasive status than the Commentary.  Second, in contrast to the Commentary, sovereigns 
around the world have adopted detailed domestic transfer pricing rules that address the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines in quite varied ways.  For example, the Nigerian Income Tax Regulations specify that 
they are to be “applied in a manner consistent with” the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines “as 
supplemented and updated from time to time.” Income Tax (Transfer Pricing) Regulation No. (1) (2012), § 
11 (Nigeria). See also Tanzania Income Tax (Transfer Pricing) Regulations (2014), § 9 (same).  In contrast, 
for countries like the United States, Brazil, India, and China, the transfer pricing guidance process at most 
involves evaluating changes to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines at the administrative level and 
determining whether or not to incorporate them into domestic law. For the purposes of this footnote, the 
key point is merely that the political economy dynamics described in Part II apply to negotiation of the 
transfer pricing guidelines, regardless of whether they do or do not apply to implementation of that soft law 
in any given state.  
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been over time.168  Thus, Model Treaty-based BEPS outputs are likely to endure over 
time.169  Moreover, the boundary between Model Treaty–based issues and other issues is 
also likely to be durable in the medium term.  The commitment by eighty countries to a 
novel OECD project to amend bilateral tax treaties using a multilateral instrument only 
strengthens this claim. 
Thus, one should anticipate that agreements reached in the BEPS project pertaining to 
treaty abuse, permanent establishment rules, and the treaty-based aspects of reining in 
hybrid planning—all of which involve changes to the OECD Model—are likely to be 
implemented around the world over time.  This result applies even though these changes 
to the OECD Model have distributive consequences, and coercive or market pressures to 
ensure adoption of the OECD Model are not in place.  In this sense, the OECD Model 
Treaty acts as an independent variable that affects international tax governance, and 
differentiates the political economy of international tax affairs from those that apply in 
international financial law.   
In contrast, those parts of the BEPS Action Plan that are based on an international 
financial law–style model are more akin to a multi-stage game.170  In the absence of 
agreed-upon coercive enforcement mechanisms, pressures to comply with agreements in 
these areas will come from the marketplace or from regional governance arrangements 
(notably the EU), or will simply be absent.171  As a result, the relevance of agreements 
that are not Model Treaty–based within the BEPS project will be determined at the 
national level, in the post-BEPS period.   
A. Treaty-based Elements of the BEPS Project Are More Likely to Be 
Effective, and Face Fewer Pressures that Limit Agreement or 
Compliance 
Bilateral tax treaties are agreements between two jurisdictions to coordinate the exercise 
of their taxing rights as contained in their respective domestic laws and set out clear 
ground rules that govern tax matters relating to cross-border trade and investment.172  
They provide relative certainty to taxpayers regarding the threshold question of whether a 
taxpayer's cross-border activities will subject it to taxation by both countries, protect 
taxpayers from potential double taxation through the allocation of taxing rights between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 See, e.g., John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 Am. J. 
Int'l L. 310, 314 (1992). 
169 Furthermore, most OECD and G-20 countries are either parliamentary democracies or autocracies.  The 
resulting single-party control of the parliament and the administration tends to mean that if the government 
negotiates a tax treaty change, it does not face other significant hurdles to ratification. 
170 C.f. Robert Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION, 427–460 (1988).   
171  Although not a focus of this paper, it is important to note that the OECD sometimes acts as an 
alternative venue in which Member States of the European Union debate issues of relevant to intra-EU 
politics.  The outcome parts of the BEPS project that are not Model Treaty-based may therefore be imposed 
on EU Member States through mechanisms for asserting pressure that are unique to the EU, and function 
only vis-à-vis EU states.  	  
172 See Klaus Vogel, Double Tax Treaties and Their Interpretation, 4 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW 1 (1986). 
WORKING DRAFT, COMMENTS WELCOME  	  
	   38 
the two countries, reduce withholding taxes that are imposed at source, and include 
provisions addressing specialized situations and administrative cooperation between 
taxing authorities.173  Over the course of the twentieth century, countries around the 
world entered into a network of almost four thousand bilateral tax treaties that address 
these issues.174  The existing treaty network is largely based on a few model treaties.  By 
far the most commonly used model is the OECD Model Treaty.175  
The OECD Model exercises an unusual gravitational pull in shaping the legal 
interpretation of bilateral tax treaties within the domestic legal systems of countries 
around the world.  The special status of the OECD Model results from three interlocked 
features of international tax policy, administration, and jurisprudence in a large number 
of states.  First, at least within the OECD, tax treaty negotiators feel substantially 
constrained to accept model treaty provisions in their future negotiations with other 
sovereigns where they have not registered a reservation or observation with respect to a 
given OECD Model Treaty provision.  Second, the manner in which domestic courts176 
and tax administrations177 in many countries around the world treat the Commentary 
substantially prewires an enforcement mechanism for changes to the OECD Model 
Treaty,178 despite its technical status as soft law.  Third, the “ambulatory theory” of treaty 
interpretation endorsed by the OECD, as well as tax administrations and national courts 
in various states, means that, as a practical matter, agreements to amend the Commentary, 
either in conjunction with or independent of changes to the OECD Model Treaty, 
significantly alter the legal meaning of existing tax treaties as well as tax treaties agreed 
to in the future. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 See Tax Treaty Benefits, IRS (2014), http://www.irs.gov/publications/p54/ch06.html.  
174 Multilateral Instrument, supra note 9.  See DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FIXING U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 
7 (Oxford Univ. Press 2014) (highlighting the oddity of focusing on juridical double taxation by observing 
that a taxpayer would rather be taxed twenty times at one percent than once at thirty-five percent).   
175 The OECD Model can, in turn, be traced back to the work of the International Chamber of Commerce 
and the League of Nations in the 1920s, as well as to Model Treaties issued in 1943 and 1946 by the 
League of Nations.  To a lesser extent, the United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between 
Developed and Developing Countries (the “UN Model”) is used as a model in negotiations between 
developed and developing countries.   
176 See, e.g., Tribunal Fiscal de la Nacion Argentina [TFN] [Fiscal Tribunal of Argentina], 3/11/1980,  “La 
Industrial Paraguaya Argentina S.A. / recurso de apelación,” (Arg.) (in absence of a definition in the “ley 
de impuesto a los réditos”, sala C of the Argentinean Tax Court cited the definition of permanent 
establishment contained in the OECD Model Treaty to define the concept “permanent establishment” under 
Argentinian law, despite the fact that Argentina was not a member of the OECD).   
177 For example, the Chilean Revenue Service, during the period that Chile was a non-OECD member, 
issued a circular indicating that the OECD Model and Commentary’s interpretation of the concept of 
“beneficial owner” should be used to interpret Chile’s tax treaties because Chile intended to follow the 
OECD Model interpretation in this regard. Chilean Revenue Service, Circular Letter Nª57/2009. 
178 For example, the tax treaty between Colombia and Chile, both non-OECD members at the time their 
treaty was negotiated, indicates that both States agree that when their treaties use the language of the 
OECD Model, the Commentary to the OECD Model should be considered as complementary means of 
interpretation of the treaty under the terms of Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
of 1969, regardless of the fact that the two countries are non-OECD members.  Corte Constitucional [C.C.] 
[Constitutional Court],  Sentencia C-5777/2009 (Colom.), available at 
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/RELATORIA/2009/C-577-09.htm.  
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1. Tax Treaty Negotiators Feel Substantially Constrained 
Most OECD member countries assume that the relevant OECD Model Treaty provision is 
the starting point for tax treaty negotiations between two states unless one of the 
countries involved in the negotiation has entered a reservation with respect to the 
provision in question.179  Moreover, countries around the world rely on the OECD Model 
Treaty as a starting point for tax treaty negotiations, even when they are not members of 
the OECD.180 
Indeed, it is often quite difficult for smaller jurisdictions to attempt to use something 
other than the OECD Model Treaty as a starting point for negotiations.  For instance, 
Colombia, a non-OECD member, tried at one point to put forth its own model.  After the 
negative response from Colombia’s trade partners, the Colombian Model was quickly 
abandoned, and negotiations were restarted, generally using the OECD Model Treaty.181   
2. Domestic Courts and National Tax Administrations Often 
Enforce the OECD Model  
There is no single, generally accepted view on the legal status of the Commentary.182  
However, the Commentary is used by the national courts of many countries to interpret 
the meaning of their bilateral tax treaties.183  These courts frequently rely on Article 31 of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 The weight given to the OECD Model explains why countries acceding to the OECD are thorough in 
documenting their reservations and observations regarding the OECD Model.  See, e.g., Accession 
Agreement of Chile to the OECD, available at http://www.oecd.org/chile/44381035.pdf. 
180 Pasquale Pistone, General Report, in THE IMPACT OF THE OECD AND UN MODEL TAX CONVENTIONS 
ON BILATERAL TAX TREATIES 2 (Michael Lang et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter IMPACT].  See also, e.g., 
Chilean Revenue Service, Circular Letter N°8/2005 (clarifying that Chile’s treaties with Brazil, Canada, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Norway, Peru, Poland, South Korea and Spain were based on the model prepared by the 
OECD, even though Chile was not a member of the OECD); Wei Cui, China, in IMPACT, at 262 (“China 
has ninety-one income tax treaties in effect… its first tax treaty took effect barely a quarter century ago… 
as China had started from a virtual tabula rasa insofar as tax treaties are concerned, however selective it has 
attempted to be, its borrowings from the Models inevitably took on a wholesale character.”  Some 
countries, however (notably Brazil and India) emphatically reject the idea that they rely on the OECD 
model to any notable extent.  See, e.g., Luis Eduardo Schoeri & Natalie Matos Silva, Brazil, in IMPACT, at 
172.   
181 Natalia Quinones Cruz, Colombia, in IMPACT , supra note 181, at 294. 
182 J. Avery Jones, The Effect of Changes in the OECD Commentary after a Treaty is Concluded, 56 
BULLETIN FOR INTERNATIONAL FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 3 (2002). 
183  For example, the Supreme Administrative Court of Finland held that “The wording of the 
Commentaries, as it was at the time the treaty was negotiated between the parties of the treaty, are 
especially important when interpreting the tax treaty in question.  However, changes made to the 
Commentaries thereafter are also of importance as a means of interpretation in the spirit of the Vienna 
Convention.”  KHO 2002:26, Supreme Administrative Court of Finland, requoted and translated in Aima, 
Frande, & Hellsten, Finland, in IMPACT, supra note 181, at 389-90.  See also Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC 
v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 120 (Ct. Cl. 1999) (after examining the commentary to the OECD Model 
Treaty from which language found in the U.S.-UK tax treaty was drawn, the Court held that the IRS was 
not allowed to determine the income of the U.S. branch of a UK bank by substituting an IRS regulatory 
formula for interest expense disallowance in place of the individualized arm’s length standard 
determination required under the treaty).  Even non-OECD countries’ courts rely on the Commentaries.  	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the Vienna Convention on the Interpretation of Treaties (Vienna Convention), for 
instance treating the OECD Model Treaty and Commentary as part of the context of the 
treaty or as providing special meaning for terms in the treaty, or as a supplementary 
means of interpretation of the treaty under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention.  U.S. 
courts are an outlier in this regard; they tend to rely less extensively on the Commentary 
because the United States—uniquely among major sovereigns—publishes a highly 
detailed technical explanation of its tax treaties at the time each such treaty is sent to the 
United States Senate for ratification.184   
Tax administrations in many OECD countries explicitly support consulting the OECD 
Model to determine the meaning of their own treaties. 185  The OECD Model Treaty and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
See supra, note 179.  Courts in many states rely on Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the 
interpretation of treaties for the proposition that bilateral tax treaties should be interpreted in light of the 
OECD Model Treaty and its commentaries.  Many courts accept the observation that the enormous amount 
of work that every OECD country puts into making and changing the Commentaries suggests that states 
concluding tax treaties would, in the absence of an observation, intend their treaties to be interpreted in 
accordance with the Commentaries.  As a result, the Commentaries are often accorded the status of the 
context or a special meaning for terms in the treaty in the sense of Articles 31(2) and (4) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties providing interpretive guidance for treaty adjudication.  Jones, supra 
note 183, at 3.   But see Michael Lang & Florian Brugger, The Role of the OECD Commentary in Tax 
Treaty Interpretation, 23 AUSTRALIAN TAX FORUM 95,  99 (2008); MICHAEL LANG, TAX TREATY 
INTERPRETATION 25-27 (Kluwer Law International, 2001) (criticizing the use of the OECD Model 
Convention Commentary as a tool of interpretation within the meaning of Article 31(2) or 31(4) of the 
Vienna Convention).  Moreover, in states that are signatories to the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, the Vienna Convention is generally viewed as reflecting customary international law.  Therefore 
the justification for using the Commentary to interpret existing bilateral tax treaties is extended even to 
treaties with partner countries that have not signed the Vienna Convention.  See, e.g., Thiel v. Comm’r of 
Taxation, 171 CLR 338 (1990) (Austl.) (holding that “While the Model Convention and Commentaries 
may not strictly amount to work preparatory to the double taxation agreement between Australia and 
Switzerland, they are documents which form the basis for the conclusion of bilateral double taxation 
agreements of the kind in question and, as with treaties in pari[?] material, provide a guide to the current 
usage of terms by the parties.  They are, therefore, a supplementary means of interpretation to which 
recourse may be had under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention… because the interpretation provisions of 
the Vienna Convention reflect the customary rules for the interpretation of treaties, it is proper to have 
regard to the terms of the Convention in interpreting the Agreement: even though Switzerland is not a party 
to that Convention”).  Countries that are not signatories to the Vienna Convention, like France and the 
United States (which publishes its own comprehensive technical explanation for every tax treaty it signs), 
similarly acknowledge that the Commentary acts as a means of interpretation for tax treaties.  See, e.g., 
Memorandum of Understanding, Interpretation of the Convention, U.S.-AUSTRIA, July 20, 1996 (providing 
that “It is understood that provisions of the Treaty that are drafted according to the corresponding 
provisions of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Model Tax 
Convention on Income and on Capital shall generally be expected to have the same meaning as expressed 
in the OECD Commentary thereon . . . . The Commentary — as it may be revised from time to time — 
constitutes a means of interpretation in the sense of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of May 
23, 1969.”) 
184 See e.g., Department of the Treasury Technical Explanation of the Convention for the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Pol., Oct. 8, 
1974, 1067 U.N.T.S. 243 (technical explanation dates from 2013); Department of the Treasury Technical 
Explanation of the Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion 
with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, Feb. 4, 2010 (pending).   
185 For instance, the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) takes the position that “the Commentaries . . . 	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Commentary as amended therefore influence the way tax administrators understand the 
meaning of their actual treaties.  Indeed, tax authorities frequently seek to justify their 
interpretations of their own tax treaties in tax litigation as being in accordance with the 
Commentary.186   
Importantly, the Commentary is, with surprising frequency, taken into consideration by 
national courts in many jurisdictions regardless of whether the text of the bilateral tax 
treaty in question in a given proceeding before the court exactly matches the language of 
the OECD Model Treaty.187  The practice of using the Commentary to interpret bilateral 
treaties even when the language of the two instruments differs is sufficiently common 
across the world that some preeminent tax treaty scholars claim that it is standard practice 
for countries to interpret their treaties in accordance with the OECD Model Treaty and 
Commentary unless it is clear that a different meaning was intended.188   
3. The “Ambulatory Theory” of Tax Treaty Interpretation in 
Effect Alters the Meaning of Past Agreements over Time 
Finally, substantial support exists in many states for an “ambulatory” approach to tax 
treaty interpretation.  Under the ambulatory approach, later-in-time Commentary 
provisions can be used to interpret tax treaties entered into before the time at which the 
Commentary was agreed upon. Various commentators have criticized the legal 
justifications for this approach.189  Nevertheless, the Commentary, which has been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
provide important guidance on interpretation and application of the OECD Model and as a matter of 
practice will often need to be considered in interpretation of [Australian tax treaties], at least where the 
wording is ambiguous, which . . . is inherently more likely in treaties than in general domestic legislation.”  
Interpreting Australia’s DTAs, AUSTRALIAN TAX OFFICE, TR 2001/13, available at 
http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/view.htm?Docid=TXR/TR200113/NAT/ATO/00001; Decree of the Ministry 
of Finance of Austria, 27 October 1995 Z 04 0610/286-IV/4/95; AOF 284/1995 (similar).  See also OECD 
Model Commentary, at para. 29 (“tax officials give great weight to the guidance contained in the 
Commentaries”).  
186 See, e.g., Catherine Brown & Martha O’Brien, Canada, in IMPACT, supra note 181, at 208. 
187 For example, the Canadian Supreme Court has described both the OECD Model Treaty and its 
Commentaries as a highly persuasive source of interpretation for provisions of its tax treaty with the United 
States, even in connection with provisions where the language of the U.S.-Canada treaty does not match the 
language of the OECD Model.  Crown Forest Indus. Ltd. V. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 802 (Can.).  See also 
Richard Vann, Interpretation of Tax Treaties in New Holland, LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER NO 10/21, 
SYDNEY LAW SCHOOL (2010). 
188 F.A. ENGELEN, INTERPRETATION OF TAX TREATIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 445-7 (Amsterdam: 
IBFD 2004).  Moreover, there is no reason to believe these practices will change in an environment 
characterized by higher political salience of international tax matters.  Judges are relatively insulated from 
political pressures, and have a compelling need for detailed guidance when interpreting tax treaties, such 
that preexisting judicial practices involving reliance on Commentary are unlikely to be changed by 
heightened political awareness regard international tax matters. 
189 See, e.g., Jones, supra note 183; M. Gunkel & B Lieber, Abkommensrechtliche Qualifikation von 
Sondervegutungen, 82 Finanz Rundscau (F.R.) 853, 858 (2000) (Ger.);  C. GABARINO, MANUALE DI 
TASSAZIONE INTERNAZIONALE 205 (2d ed. 2008).  As a matter of principle it seems clear that commentaries 
published after a treaty has been entered into cannot be treated as part of the intention of the original treaty 
negotiators, or be an agreement made in connection with the conclusion of the treaty, or contain a special 
meaning to which the parties had agreed.   
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universally endorsed by OECD states, explicitly endorses an ambulatory approach to tax 
treaty interpretation.190  Furthermore, the Vienna Convention provides some justification 
for the ambulatory approach.191  Indeed, some tax administrations separately affirm their 
support for the ambulatory approach in domestically issued guidance documents.192  As a 
practical matter, long-held conventional wisdom provides that “tax administration is tax 
policy.” 193   Even more importantly, courts in various states routinely engage in 
ambulatory interpretation, using later-in-time Commentary to interpret the meaning of tax 
treaty provisions concluded before the Commentary language was written.194  Thus, the 
ambulatory approach to understanding tax treaties to a large extent shapes the meaning of 
the law as much as the text of the treaty itself. 
In sum, the deference that treaty negotiators, courts, and tax administrations of many 
states give to the OECD Model provides a built-in enforcement mechanism for the Model 
Treaty-based portions of international tax law.  This enforcement mechanism is 
substantially more effective than the enforcement mechanisms known in international 
financial law, despite the fact that the OECD Model (like international financial law 
instruments) is a form of soft law.  Moreover, mock compliance by state actors is less of 
a concern in international agreements reached with respect to the OECD Model than it is 
outside the treaty area because treaty language is fully observable, both taxpayers and tax 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 OECD (2012), Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 2010 (updated 2010), at para. 33, 
OECD Publishing, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/978926417517-en; But see Ellis M, The Influence 
of the OECD Commentaries on Treaty Interpretation—Response to Prof Dr Klaus Vogel, IBFD BULLETIN 
2000, at 618 (“it seems to me that the OECD Fiscal Committee and the Commentary making a statement 
that new versions of the Model and new versions of the Commentary should be used as proper means of 
interpretation of older treaties remind me of Baron Münchhausen pulling himself out of a morass by his 
own hair. I find it very surprising that such a group of—be it authoritative—people can determine how 
authoritative they themselves shall be…).” 
191 See Vann, supra note 188, at 7.  
192 See, e.g., BMF, Z 04 0610/286-iV/4/95, AOFV 284/1995 (Austrian Tax Administration); Interpreting 
Australia’s DTAs, AUSTRALIAN TAX OFFICE, TR 2001/13, at para. 108, available at 
http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/view.htm?Docid=TXR/TR200113/NAT/ATO/00001.   
193 Milton Casanegra de Jantscher, Administering the VAT, in VALUE ADDED TAXATION IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTIES 171, 179 (M. Gillis, C. Shoup, & G. P. Sicat eds., 1990). 
194 For instance, the Norwegian Supreme Court explicitly justified using the current Commentary to the 
OECD Model in a case wherein they were interpreting a tax treaty that was concluded before that 
Commentary had been agreed in connection with a tax treaty with a non-OECD Member.  See PGS, Rt. 
2004, p. 957 (Utv. 2004 p. 649) (Norwegian Supreme Court) (relying on the then-current Commentary to 
the OECD Model to interpret an earlier tax treaty with the Ivory Coast in connection with the question of 
whether performing seismic and electromagnetic services could create a permanent establishment).  The 
Canadian tax court held that later-in-time OECD documents could be used as extrinsic aids to interpretation 
of past tax treaties in the context of the U.S.-Canada treaties’ rules regarding beneficial ownership and the 
treatment of U.S. limited liability companies.  TD Securities (USA) LLC v. The Queen, [2010] D.T.C. 
1137 (Can.).  In contrast, the Administrative Supreme Court of France has ruled that it is not necessary to 
refer to commentaries that are adopted after a given tax treaty is negotiated in interpreting the tax treaty.  
See CE Sect., Dec. 30, 2003, No. 233894, SA Andritz, available at www.rajf.org/spip.php?article2235.  
See also H. Perdriel Vaissiere & E Raingeard de law Bletiere, France, in IMPACT, supra note 181, at 429.  
But even in jurisdictions where courts have held that they do not take later OECD Commentaries into 
account, textual analysis suggests that such commentaries are often consulted simply to cope with the 
difficulty of some treaty interpretation questions that arise.  Id. at 430.  See also 78a INT’L FISCAL ASSOC., 
INTERPRETATION OF DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTIONS 63-65 (1993). 
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administrations may rely on OECD Model-based interpretive arguments in court, and 
judges in most jurisdictions are genuinely independent of the administrative state.  At the 
same time, in the face of the political imperative created by G-20 convocation and the 
application of international financial law–style pressures, in the BEPS project, tax treaty 
negotiators feel constrained from expressing their traditional hesitancy to reach 
agreement to changes to the OECD Model or from asserting reservations where they are 
disinclined to agree with a majority. 195   The combination of the legal efficacy 
traditionally associated with the OECD Model and the political efficacy associated with 
an international financial law–style process is what makes it so likely that the Model 
Treaty-based components of the BEPS project will be implemented.  As a result, 
negotiations that result in changes to the OECD Model Treaty and Commentary in effect 
approach a one-stage legal game.  Compliance and enforcement is relatively certain when 
agreement on these soft-law changes is reached.  Longstanding bureaucratic processes in 
national tax administrations and interpretive tools used by domestic courts do much of 
the hard work of implementation.  
B. Examples 
1. Proposed Changes to the Permanent Establishment Rules 
Changes proposed by the BEPS project to the “permanent establishment” threshold in the 
OECD Model Treaty provide an example of how changes to the treaty-based portions of 
international tax law’s “soft” architecture can become self-enforcing.   
Tax treaties specify when an enterprise based in one state has a sufficient connection to 
another state to justify taxation by the latter state.  A sufficient connection exists when an 
enterprise resident in one state (the “residence state”) has a “permanent establishment” in 
another state (the “source state”).  The permanent establishment threshold must be met 
before the source state may tax that enterprise on active business income properly 
attributable to that enterprise’s activity in the source state.  An important definitional 
approach taken in the OECD Model Treaty is to specify certain activities that do not 
constitute a permanent establishment.  Accordingly, Article 5(4) of the OECD Model 
Treaty enumerates certain “specific activity exemptions” that are assumed to contribute 
only marginally to the profits of an enterprise, and therefore are thought not to warrant 
taxation by that jurisdiction.  For example, Article 5(4) provides that the maintenance of a 
stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise, and the use of facilities solely 
for the purpose of storage or delivery of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise 
do not constitute a permanent establishment.196  The specific activity exemption approach 
is intended to provide businesses with greater certainty as to when they should expect to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 The United States is in fact threatening at this time to make a reservation on the permanent 
establishment rules being negotiated as part of the BEPS project.  However, it is the only jurisdiction 
making this threat, and the importance of that threat is limited, given U.S. MNCs’ reliance on foreign-to-
foreign planning, as described in Part IB.   
196  Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital Art. 5(4)(a), (b), OECD PUBLISHING (2014), 
available at http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/model-tax-convention-on-
income-and-on-capital-condensed-version-2014_mtc_cond-2014-en#page24.  
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be taxed in a source state, while improving administrability by limiting the need for case-
by-case determinations.   
In the BEPS project, however, many countries have focused on the idea that 
technological progress (especially the Internet) and the globalization of business have 
made it easier to be heavily involved in the economic life of another jurisdiction, without 
meeting the historic permanent establishment threshold.  As a result, the BEPS project 
includes proposals to modify the permanent establishment threshold as it appears in the 
current OECD Model Treaty.  One leading proposal is to modify the definition of a 
permanent establishment so as to make each of the “specific activity exemptions” subject 
to a “preparatory and auxiliary” limitation.  Under this limitation, each of the specific 
activity exceptions would only apply if the given activity had a “preparatory or auxiliary 
character” taken in the context of the business enterprise as a whole.197   
At the level of multilateral negotiation of soft law, this represents a case where 
preferences are aligned among major economies, with one significant outlier: the United 
States.  Outside of a G-20–convened process, it is quite likely that strident opposition 
from the United States would be sufficient to prevent the consensus required for adoption 
of such a change in the permanent establishment rules in the OECD Model Treaty.198  
However, G-20 convocation has given other countries the willingness and ability to force 
through changes to the OECD Model Treaty, even if it comes with a U.S. reservation 
about this provision.  Moreover, the United States’ reservation is unlikely to be of much 
practical effect, as a result of the U.S. MNCs’ high reliance on foreign-to-foreign tax 
planning,199 in combination with the unusual efficacy of the OECD Model. 
The built-in enforcement mechanisms for the OECD Model suggest that when new PE 
rules are adopted in the OECD Model Treaty—as is generally expected—tax 
administrations and courts are likely to apply them to some significant degree, regardless 
of when countries modify their tax treaties to be consistent with the new OECD Model 
Treaty.  Indeed, various governments are already claiming that the permanent 
establishment rules in the current OECD Model Treaty are consistent with the idea that 
the specific activity exemptions are subject to a preparatory or auxiliary limitation.200  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 See Revised Discussion Draft BEPS Action 7: Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of PE Status, OECD 
21-22 (May 15, 2015–June 12, 2015), available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/revised-discussion-
draft-beps-action-7-pe-status.pdf.  
198 Unlike almost any other state, the United States has never reserved on any Article or paragraph of the 
OECD Model Treaty.  One way to understand this result is that, outside G-20 processes, U.S. opposition to 
a provision in the OECD Model Treaty was considered enough to block the “consensus” required for a 
change to be agreed to the Model (whereas the same was not always true of opposition from other states).  
In the context of the BEPS project, however, it appears that consensus will be achieved on changes to the 
PE provisions by allowing the United States to enter a reservation.  That “solution” to achieving consensus 
has been used before with other states, but not with the United States.   
199 See discussion at note 13 and accompanying text, infra. 
200 For instance, the Israeli Tax Authority recently put out a Draft Circular that suggests that the PE 
exceptions provided under paragraphs a) through d) of Article 5(4) of the OECD Model Treaty are subject 
to the additional requirement that the activities referred to in that section are of only a “preparatory or 
auxiliary” nature.  See Leon Harris, Foreign Cyberspace Operators Could be Swept into Israeli Tax Net, 	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Perhaps tellingly, Amazon—arguably the company most obviously affected by the 
addition of the preparatory and auxiliary limitation on the specific activity exemptions on 
the use of a facility for storing and delivering merchandise to customers—recently 
changed the structure of its operations in a number of European jurisdictions so as to 
unambiguously subject themselves to tax on a net basis on sales in those jurisdictions.201  
Presumably they did so after judging that the OECD Model changes would be 
sufficiently self-enforcing that the wiser course was to avoid audits and litigation over 
whether they do or do not have permanent establishments in many of the jurisdictions in 
which they provide customers with goods.  
  2. Proposed Changes to Combat Treaty Abuse: The Limitation       
on Benefits Provision 
Some changes to tax treaty–based rules are sufficiently broad that it seems unlikely that 
these changes would be imputed into existing treaties by courts (or tax administrators) on 
the basis of changes to the OECD Model without an amendment to the relevant bilateral 
treaties.  Consider, for example, the “limitation on benefits” (LoB) article being proposed 
as part of the BEPS project.  LoB provisions are intended to determine whether a 
taxpayer has a sufficient nexus to a contracting state to be treated as eligible for the tax 
treaty benefits provided for in a given bilateral tax treaty.202  LoB provisions make that 
determination through a series of clearly delineated and often quite complicated objective 
tests.203  An LoB article is one alternative for addressing tax treaty abuse under a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Worldwide Tax Daily (Apr. 7, 2015) (discussing the content of the ITA’s draft circular). See Israeli Tax 
Guidance on On-line Activity of Foreign Companies, Newsletter (MEITAR, Ramat Gan, Isr.), Apr. 2015.   
Government officials from jurisdictions as diverse as Germany and India have publicly articulated similar 
views.  These claims are being made despite the fact that the “preparatory and auxiliary” language in 
Article 5(4)(e) and 5(4)(f) of the OECD Model Treaty quite clearly provides an additional exception to 
permanent establishment status, rather than a limitation on the availability of the other exceptions to 
permanent establishment status.  The discussion of the Commentary to Article 5(4) of the OECD Model 
Treaty as it stood as of 2014 highlights the intended effect of the “preparatory and auxiliary” language in 
Art. 5(4)(e) and 5(4)(f).  See paragraph 21 of the Commentary providing that “[w]here each of the activities 
listed in subparagraphs a) to d) is the only activity carried on at a fixed place of business, the place is 
deemed not to constitute a permanent establishment.”  Note that this sentence was added to the 
Commentary in 2011 after specifically considering the question as to whether each of the exceptions in 
subparagraphs a) through d) should be subject to a “preparatory and auxiliary” limitation.  At the time, that 
suggestion was rejected, and instead text was added to the Commentary to clarify that no such limitation 
was intended, or had ever been in place.  See Interpretation and Application of Article 5 (Permanent 
Establishment) of the OECD Model Tax Convention OECD, at para. 74 (Oct. 12, 2011–Feb. 10, 2012) 
available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/48836726.pdf.  
201 See Stephanie Soong Johnston, Amazon EU to Book Profits in Local Countries, 78 TAX NOTES INT’L 
797 (June 1, 2015); Lisa Fleisher & Sam Schechner, Amazon Changes Tax Practices in Europe Amid 
Investigations, WSJ (May 24, 2015, 7:15 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-changes-tax-practices-
in-europe-amid-investigations-1432480170. 
202 John Bates & Alexander Rust et al., Limitations on Benefits Articles in Income Tax Treaties: The 
Current State of Play. 41 INTERTAX 395, 395 (2013). 
203 See, e.g., United States Model Income Tax Convention of November 15, 2006, art. 22 (2006); United 
States Model Technical Explanation Accompanying the United States Model Income Tax Convention of 
November 15, 2006, 63-73 (2006); Revised Discussion Draft BEPS Action 6: Prevent Treaty Abuse, OECD 	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“minimum standard” approach to treaty abuse that the BEPS project intends to 
establish.204  The OECD accordingly proposes to incorporate the LoB rule as a new, 
independent article in the OECD Model Treaty.  Given that adding an LoB to an existing 
tax treaty generally requires adding an entirely new treaty article that creates previously 
non-existent bright-line limitations on eligibility for treaty benefits, courts are unlikely to 
impute LoB rules into existing tax treaties in any jurisdiction, absent explicit amendment 
to the tax treaty in question.  Ambulatory interpretation has its limits. 
Nevertheless, the new “minimum standard” in the treaty abuse area is likely to be rapidly 
implemented by most jurisdictions.  Treaty negotiators who might otherwise have 
reserved on the LoB, the alternative “principal purpose test” (“PPT”, see explanation 
below) for addressing treaty abuse, or both, generally feel constrained from doing so by 
the political pressure they face to agree on outputs as part of the BEPS project.  At the 
same time, after the BEPS process is over, it is unlikely that the existing norm—that 
countries start negotiating from the OECD Model Treaty unless one of the countries has 
made an observation or reservation on that provision—will cease to apply.  Instead, it 
seems likely that treaty negotiators will feel pressured to meet the minimum standard on 
treaty abuse in one way or another once they have agreed to this change in the Model 
Treaty.   
Moreover, the alternative approach to meeting the “minimum standard” to combat treaty 
abuse that the OECD has agreed upon, the “principal purpose test” (PPT) proposal, is 
subject to ambulatory interpretation.  The PPT alternative would add a rule to tax treaties 
providing that tax treaty benefits will be denied to a taxpayer on an item of income or 
capital if it is reasonable to conclude that obtaining that benefit was one of the principal 
purposes of any arrangement or transaction that resulted directly or indirectly in that 
benefit, unless it is established that granting that benefit in the relevant circumstances 
would be in accordance with the object and purpose of the relevant provisions of the tax 
treaty.205  The PPT is being described in proposed new Commentary as consistent with 
longstanding principles of tax treaty interpretation.206  Given the ambulatory approach to 
treaty interpretation, courts in various jurisdictions are likely to import the PPT into 
existing tax treaties (unless their tax administration alternatively adopts LoB rules for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4-16 (May 22, 2015–June 17, 2015), available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/revised-discussion-draft-
beps-action-6-prevent-treaty-abuse.pdf.   
204 See OECD/G-20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Action 6: 2014 Deliverable Preventing the 
Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, OECD PUBLISHING at para. 14 (2014), 
available at http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/download/2314281e.pdf?expires=1436316471&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=
78DBAE49BACA113169139A080AC0CE2E; Revised Discussion Draft BEPS Action 6: Prevent Treaty 
Abuse,  OECD, at para. 5 (May 22, 2015–June 17, 2015), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/revised-discussion-draft-beps-action-6-prevent-treaty-abuse.pdf.   
205  OECD/G-20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Action 6: 2014 Deliverable Preventing the 
Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, OECD PUBLISHING 66-67, available at 
http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/download/2314281e.pdf?expires=1436316471&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=
78DBAE49BACA113169139A080AC0CE2E.  
206 Id. at 88. 	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country’s treaties).207  Thus, the area of tax treaty abuse provides another example of how 
the constraints felt by tax treaty negotiators in combination with the ambulatory theory of 
tax treaty interpretation make the OECD Model particularly effective as a form of soft 
law.   
C. What About Treaty Overrides?   
In the majority of countries around the world, tax treaties are, speaking very generally, 
legally superior to domestic law.208  One consequence of the legal priority given to 
treaties is that the tools used to interpret those treaties implicitly receive that same 
priority. This legal fact is another key reason that the OECD Model is so efficacious in 
many countries around the world—Model Treaty-based interpretive principles used by 
courts to interpret bilateral tax treaties can implicitly trump domestic law, even though 
the OECD Model is non-legally binding instrument.   
However, in many common law countries—a minority of jurisdictions globally—
domestic legislation is generally required to implement treaty obligations.209   In these 
countries, as well as other countries where treaties and statutes have no priority vis-à-vis 
one another, treaties are subject to repeal by later-in-time legislation.210  Nevertheless, as 
a historical matter, in the tax area the overwhelming majority of countries in which treaty 
overrides are theoretically possible have remained highly averse to enacting tax treaty 
overrides through later-in-time domestic statutes.  Indeed, in the late 1980s, when the 
United States enacted two tax treaty overrides, the OECD issued a report that quite 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 The potential for PPT importation is particularly high in the many countries whose tax legislation 
includes general anti-abuse rules that are subject to judicial interpretation.  For two surveys of general anti-
abuse rules in various states, see GAAR Rising: Mapping Tax Enforcement’s Evolution, EY (Feb. 2013), 
available at 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/GAA_rising/$FILE/GAAR_rising_1%20Feb_2013.pdf, and 
Removing the Fences: Looking Through GAAR, PWC (Feb. 2012), available at 
https://www.pwc.in/assets/pdfs/publications-2012/pwc-white-paper-on-gaar.pdf.  Both surveys highlight 
that in various jurisdictions general anti-abuse rules are being applied to treaty issues even though there is 
no explicit authorization for doing so. 
208	  See Reuvan S. Avi-Yonah, Tax Treaty Overrides: A Qualified Defense of U.S. Practice, in TAX 
TREATIES AND DOMESTIC LAW 65 (Guglielmo Maisto, ed., 2006).  Space does not permit me to fully 
describe the various ways that domestic legal systems address the relationship of treaty law to domestic 
statutes, or to engage with the long-standing “monist/dualist” debate regarding whether treaties should have 
the formal status of law in a domestic legal order without further action by a legislature that formally 
incorporates that treaty into the relevant domestic law.  However, speaking very roughly, the majority of 
states take a more ‘monist’ perspective – meaning that treaties that have entered into force do not 
necessarily require separate implementing legislation to become part of domestic law, and usually override 
any inconsistent domestic legislation, whether existing or future.  ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW 
AND PRACTICE 181-95 (2d ed. 2007). 
209 Id. 210	  For example, in the United States, treaties and statutes are both the law of the land, but treaties may be 
overridden by later-in-time statutes.  See, e.g., John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal 
Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 Am. J. Int’l L. 310, 314-315 (1992). 	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scathingly condemned such behavior, and that report received equal levels of support 
from common law and civil law countries alike.211  
However, domestic law measures that could be characterized as tax treaty overrides were 
recently proposed in Australia and enacted in the UK in reaction to the BEPS project. 212 
Officials from both governments describe these legislative actions as a response to the 
heightened political salience of international tax affairs.  In its 2015–2016 budget, the 
Australian government announced that it would introduce a provision that would allow 
the Commissioner of Taxation to cancel the Australian tax benefits obtained in 
connection with an identified “scheme” to “artificially” avoid having a permanent 
establishment as defined in Australia’s current tax treaties.213  The UK’s diverted profits 
tax (“DPT”) came into effect on April 1, 2015, and targets for taxation instances where, 
under existing permanent establishment rules, an MNC legitimately avoids a UK taxable 
presence, but the MNC continues to have activities in the UK in connection with the 
supply of goods or services to UK customers.214 
Even these exceptional cases, however, suggest that the OECD Model Treaty remains 
efficacious.  For instance, although the legislation proposed in Australia would override 
Australia’s tax treaties and in effect create a new PE threshold in Australia for certain 
large foreign MNCs, the rules proposed in that legislation are commensurate with the two 
leading OECD proposals for revising the OECD Model’s PE threshold as part of the 
BEPS project.215  In other words, the Australian proposal is best characterized as an 
attempt to enact the BEPS project’s PE outputs without bothering to negotiate with other 
states about the substance of Australia’s actual bilateral tax treaties.  While such an action 
would be a treaty override, it does not weaken (indeed, perhaps strengthens) the case that 
changes to the OECD Model are self-enforcing. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Tax Treaty Overrides, OECD (1989), reprinted in OECD Committee on 
Fiscal Affairs Report on Tax Treaty Overrides, 2 Tax Notes Int’l 25 (Jan. 1990). 
212 Bob Stack, the senior United States international tax official at the Department of the Treasury, made a 
similar observation in a heavily reported speech:  “Both the UK and Australian approach use as a starting 
point in the application of their PE-related diverted profits approach, that goods or services are provided in 
their jurisdiction, and there is some activity in the jurisdiction related to the sales of those goods or 
services…[W]e all learned in our introductory international tax law classes that this is the very issue that is 
addressed directly by the PE rules in a treaty…”  Robert Stack, Address at the 2015 OECD International 
Tax Conference (June 11, 2015) (Transcript made by the author, taking notes at the speech).  
213See Exposure Draft, Tax Laws Amendment (Tax Integrity Multinational Anti-Avoidance Law) Bill 2015 
(Austl.); Explanatory Memorandum, Tax Laws Amendment (Tax Integrity Multinational Anti-Avoidance 
Law) Bill 2015, at para. 1.15 (Austl.). 
214 Finance Act 2015, c. 4,  §§ 77-116 (U.K.); see also Diverted Profits Tax Client Briefing, SKADDEN 
(Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.skadden.com/newsletters/Diverted_Profits_Tax%20_Client_Briefing.pdf. 215	  Explanatory Memorandum, Tax Laws Amendment (Tax Integrity Multi-national Anti-Avoidance Law) 
Bill 2015 6-20 (Austl.).  Indeed, when asked at a major OECD tax conference what more the Australian 
proposal would reach if one assumed all BEPS PE proposals were enacted into Australia’s tax treaties, 
Australia’s leading international tax official responded that in such a circumstance there would be no 
further items to address.  Notes of Author in response to question posed by author at OECD-USCIB 
conference June 11-June 12, 2015.  	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The UK DPT represents a harder case.  The DPT is not consistent with the parameters of 
the OECD’s ongoing work on the PE threshold.  Moreover, under UK domestic law, 
taxpayers only have standing to challenge a UK tax as inconsistent with the UK’s tax 
treaties to the extent provided by statute, and the existing UK statute may not extend to 
the DPT, so recourse to tax treaties and therefore Model Treaty-based interpretive 
principles may not be available.216 Nevertheless, closer inspection of the DPT leaves 
some room for doubt as to how often it will in fact be imposed.  Unlike every other UK 
tax, the DPT is effectively electively assessed by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
(HMRC), so some practitioners have suggested that the DPT is a purely prophylactic 
measure.217  Moreover, it seems likely that HMRC would hesitate to a greater degree in 
assessing the DPT in circumstances when the taxpayer is within the bounds of revised 
OECD Model Treaty PE principles than it would otherwise.218  Thus, even analysis of the 
DPT—the exception that proves the rule—supports the idea that bifurcating analysis 
between Model Treaty-based and non-Model Treaty-based measures remains appropriate.  
D. The Multilateral Instrument and the Boundaries of the Model Treaty  
The outcome of the work on a multilateral instrument as part of the BEPS Action Plan 
illustrates both that the boundary between Model Treaty-based and non-Model Treaty-
based parts of the international tax architecture is durable and that marrying the political 
efficacy of international financial law with the legal efficacy of the OECD Model Treaty 
process may be highly effective.  As part of the BEPS Action Plan, a report entitled 
“Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties” (Multilateral 
Instrument Report) was delivered to the G-20 in September 2014.219  In early 2015, all G-
20 and OECD countries endorsed a mandate to negotiate this instrument.220  This 
multilateral instrument, if successfully completed, will substantially streamline the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 Dan Neidle et al., The UK Diverted Profits Tax: Final Legislation Published, CLIFFORD CHANCE (Mar. 
25, 2015), http://www.cliffordchance.com/briefings/2015/03/the_uk_diverted_profitstaxfinallegislatio.html 
(explaining that the relevant provision of the Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act (2010), 
section 6 does not refer to the DPT and likely will not be amended to provide recourse for domestic 
taxpayers).  
217  UK Releases Details Regarding Diverted Profits Tax, EY (Dec. 11, 2014),	  
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/UK_releases_details_regarding_Diverted_Profits_Tax/$FILE
/2014G_CM4998_UK%20releases%20details%20re%20DPT.pdf.  
218 Indeed, other sovereigns may take measures to retaliate against the UK DPT to the extent the UK tries to 
impose it beyond the boundaries of PE rules as agreed upon in the BEPS project.  For instance, the UK 
DPT (tellingly referred to by leading UK politicians as the “Google Tax”) is widely suspected of being a 
discriminatory tax by U.S. practitioners and tax authorities.  Section 891 of the Internal Revenue Code 
provides that income taxes paid by UK corporations doing business in the United States would double if the 
President found that a UK tax was being imposed extraterritorially or discriminatorily on U.S.-parented 
MNCs.  	  
219 Multilateral Instrument, supra note 9, at 10. The author was an outside consultant to the OECD in the 
development of this report, as well as a member of the informal group of academic experts assembled to 
examine the feasibility of modifying 3,800 different bilateral treaties through a single multilateral 
instrument.   
220 OECD/G-20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Action 15: A Mandate for the Development of a 
Multilateral Instrument on Tax Treaty Measure to Tackle BEPS, OECD PUBLISHING (2014), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-action-15-mandate-for-development-of-multilateral-instrument.pdf.   
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process of modifying certain treaty-based rules that are common to the existing bilateral 
treaties of participating states.  However, although the multilateral instrument may amend 
a very large percentage of the world’s existing bilateral tax treaties to make them 
consistent with BEPS treaty-based recommendations, it is structured to do so without 
abandoning the basic bilateral structure of tax treaties, and without changing which parts 
of the international tax architecture are within and outside the tax treaty architecture.221  
Indeed, the Multilateral Instrument Report emphasizes that doing anything more would 
be overbroad given the overarching importance countries place on “tax sovereignty.”222 
The OECD could never have studied the possibility of a multilateral instrument of this 
sort, let alone obtained agreement to launch such a negotiation, without the political will 
associated with G-20 convocation.  Tax experts brought together by the League of 
Nations, who in the 1920s and 1930s did the initial work that underlies the OECD Model 
Treaty, originally conceived of a tax treaty as a multilateral instrument.223  The 1963 
OECD Model Treaty was similarly intended as a model for multilateral negotiations 
within the OECD; as late as 1977, OECD treaty documents still encouraged a multilateral 
approach where feasible.224  Yet from then until the G-20 became involved, all groups of 
officials who opined on actually launching a multilateral negotiation came out against 
this approach.225  As the Multilateral Instrument Report emphasizes, it required “strong 
impetus at the highest political level” to achieve “political acceptance from a critical 
mass of jurisdictions” for a multilateral negotiation.226  When the G-20 became involved, 
after almost a hundred years of resistance, a negotiation to create a hard-law, multilateral 
tax treaty instrument began in earnest.  It is instructive that even this historic multilateral 
tax treaty negotiating process is premised on preserving the border between Model 
Treaty–based measures and other parts of international tax policy.   
IV. Conclusion 
International tax law has entered a new era of multilateralism.  Over the last few years, in 
response to unprecedented political attention to international taxation, the G-20 has acted 
as the primary agenda-setter for international tax diplomacy.  G-20 convocation, 
standard-setting, and monitoring, as well as a general reliance on informal political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 Multilateral Instrument, supra note 9, at 12-13.  	  
222 Multilateral Instrument, supra note 9, at 16.  The report emphasized that “in tax matters, the concept of 
sovereignty underpins the stable tax framework within which governments have been able to facilitate 
arrangements that allowed for the benefits of globalization to flow to all market economies… Recognizing 
the tax sovereignty concern, the report focuses on implementing treaty measures, even though a multilateral 
instrument could in principle also be used to express commitments to implement domestic law measures.”  
Id. at 13.   
223 Report Presented by the Fiscal Comm. on the Work of the Third Session of the Committee, League of 
Nations Doc. C.415.M.171 1931 II (1931) (Appendix I-III).    
224 See Jeffrey Owen & Mary Bennett, OECD Model Tax Convention, OECD OBSERVER (Oct. 2008), 
http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.php/aid/2756/OECD_Model_Tax_Convention.html; Klaus 
Vogel, Double Tax Treaties and Their Interpretation, 4 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 1, 11 (1986).  
225 See Richard Vann, A Model Tax Treaty for the Asia-Pacific Region? 45 BULLETIN FOR INT’L FISCAL 
DOCUMENTATION 151-163 (Apr. 1991).   
226 Multilateral Instrument, supra note 9, at 10, 13.  
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declarations, are becoming an established part of the international tax landscape.  
Moreover, given the heightened political profile of international tax affairs, and the 
tendency for the G-20 to continue pursuing an issue once it begins to do so, there is no 
reason to believe that this phenomenon is temporary.  Rather, we likely have a “new 
normal.”  
The soft law created in G-20–convened processes differs in kind from the soft law that is 
familiar to practitioners from the OECD Model.  Instead, this form of soft law is quite 
similar procedurally to international financial law.  Past evidence suggests that successful 
implementation of international financial law–style economic governance requires 
multiple elements:  agreement as to standards, monitoring that effectively determines 
whether standards are being met, enforcement mechanisms that ensure initial 
implementation by a sufficiently broad range of states, and continuing pressures that 
ensure ongoing compliance.  Quite often, one or more of these elements is missing or 
fades over time. 
On the other hand, the deference that treaty negotiators, courts, and tax administrations 
give to the OECD Model Treaty and Commentary provides a built-in enforcement 
mechanism that is substantially more effective than the enforcement mechanisms known 
in international financial law.  As a result, the patterns seen in international financial law 
implementation are not likely to be replicated in the parts of the BEPS project that play 
off the tax treaty architecture.  The fact that a multilateral instrument to implement 
OECD Model Treaty–based BEPS measures is to be negotiated only strengthens this 
conclusion.  In the Model Treaty–based space, implementation into hard law of changes 
agreed to in the course of the BEPS project is likely to be rather swift.  
Marrying the political efficacy of G-20–convened soft-law processes with the legal 
efficacy of changes to the OECD Model is powerful.  The deep shadow of potential non-
compliance that sits over agenda items in international financial law, or other parts of the 
BEPS Action Plan, does not affect Model Treaty-based measures to nearly the same 
extent.  Whether this is a feature or a bug of the new procedural architecture for 
governing international tax affairs depends both on the participant’s perspective and 
interests and on the level of clarity reached in the amendments to the OECD Model.  
Certainly, if one views global consistency as a desirable end in itself, then the new 
procedural architecture is very effective in achieving that result.  Those national actors 
whose goals are met by the changes to the OECD Model will also find it desirable.  On 
the other hand, various actors may have concerns if changes to the OECD Model increase 
uncertainty, since most actors have at least some interest in clarifying preexisting areas of 
controversy. Of course, where new agreements are against national interest, particular 
actors will also be displeased with the results. 
The boundary between Model Treaty–based and other parts of the international tax 
architecture is durable.  Accordingly, analysis and forecasting of the future of the 
international tax regime should be bifurcated between those issue areas that are or can 
easily be incorporated into bilateral tax treaties, and those that cannot.  Outside the Model 
Treaty–based space, as long as international tax matters remain highly politically salient, 
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international tax agreements are most likely to be effective if preferences are aligned and 
distributive problems are largely absent among the major economies.  Information-
sharing agreements, which come with a strong logic of appropriateness associated with 
transparency and can be described as producing non-rival benefits, are thus one category 
of agreement that is likely to be implemented.  Agreements in principle may be reached 
in cases where incentives are not aligned among major state actors.  However, for those 
agreements to be implemented will require the exercise of coercion by a sufficiently 
powerful subset of leading economies, or market pressures that allow a subset of states to 
impose a standard without affirmatively coercing other states—in combination with 
administrable monitoring mechanisms.  These conditions may often be absent or fade 
over time.  
As a result, outside the Model Treaty–based and transparency areas, post-BEPS 
policymaking may, ironically, be characterized by policy fragmentation along national 
lines, rather than a more consistent international regime.  Non-implementation of OECD 
recommendations will help shape the environment, and policy proposals that received 
substantial attention in the context of BEPS may act as a locus for subsequent policy 
debates at the domestic level.  The importance of arguments about policy coherence 
developed among tax regulators gathered at the OECD may decline, while the logic of 
consequences dominates decision-making.  Where agreements in principle are reached 
but monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are not sufficiently binding, mock 
compliance by both states and private actors is likely to emerge.  Agreements reached in 
principle and national decisions regarding implementation often will not align.  
Importantly, however, Model Treaty–based agreements will be spared these pressures. 
Therefore, analyzing the future of the international tax regime requires breaking BEPS in 
two.  Only then can we understand how international tax governance is likely to go 
forward at the multilateral level.  This result should be relevant to anyone interested in 
international economic law.  It highlights how international finance and international tax 
are becoming procedurally similar tasks of international economic diplomacy and 
governance.  At the same time, it differentiates international tax from other areas of 
international economic regulation because of the OECD Model.  In doing so, the Article 
provides a high-profile example of how the character of underlying legal institutions can 
alter the implementation prospects of international regulatory agreements.  
 
